Претседателот на Република Македонија Бранко Црвенковски оствари средба со Генералниот секретар на ОН, Бан Ки Мун и даде изјави од кои боли глава:
„Претседателот Црвенковски истакна дека станува збор за една контрадикторна ситуација во која што ОН како организација водат де факто спротивна политика од онаа што ја водат мнозинството членки во организацијата затоа што Република Македонија веќе е признаена од 117 членки на ОН со своето уставното име.“
И покрај тоа што ОН водат „контрадикторна“ политика, Република Македонија ќе ги продолжи разговорите, како дел од „спротивната политика од онаа што ја водат мнозинството членки во организацијата“:
„За името е направен преседан што не е направен со ниту една земја членка меѓутоа и покрај тоа Република Македонија ќе ги продолжи разговорите согласно Резолуцијата на ОН водејќи сметка за своите национални и државни интереси истакна Претседателот Црвенковски.“
Како може некој да обвинува за контрадикторност, а истовремено да продуцира контрадикторни ставови и постапки? Ако е контрадикторно продолжувањето на разговорите во услови кога не имаат признаено мнозинството членки на ОН, тогаш зошто едноставно не ги прекинете?
Врз основа на што е изведен заклучокот дека продолжувањето на разговорите е согласно нашите „национални и државни интереси“?
И што се подразбира под „национални и државни интереси“? Дали тоа значи дека нашите „национални интереси“ се разликуваат од нашите „државни интереси“?
Ако не, зашто не се употребува само зборот „национални“ или зборот „државни“?
5 коментари:
APPEAL TO THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PRESIDENT OF SERBIA
In the case of establishment of the Tribunal for war crimes in the former Yugoslavia, it was apparent that a precedent has been made when resolutions of the United Nations Security Council (808. and 827.) in 1993 established a new provisional organ with the broad judicial competences. These acts were based on the UN Security Council Resolution 777(1992) and the UN General Assembly Resolution 47/1(1992), and on the assumption that former state (Yugoslavia) as a UN member ceased to exist. In our view, since UN Security Council does not have necessary judicial or legislative legal-setting (norm-creating) functions and powers, and since UN Security Council Resolution 777(1992) and the UN General Assembly Resolution 47/1 (1992) can not alter the basic rights of a member state (FRY), UN Security Council Resolutions 808/1993 and 827/1993 establishing the Tribunal (as an organ of the UN Security Council) represent an ultra vires act of the United Nations. It is apparent that UN organ, such as UN Security Council, can not confer more powers to the other organ (Tribunal for war crimes), than those it has itself, provided by UN Charter. For these reasons, we appeal to the Government of Serbia and the President of Serbia to request that the following Draft Resolution be placed at the next Session of the UN General Assembly:
DRAFT RESOLUTION
The General Assembly,
Considering the Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations,
Considering the functions and powers in the Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
Considering the General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of 1946, and, in particular, the legal character of Article 1 and Article 8 (30),
Taking note that a difference in the legal interpretation of the Charter of the United Nations has arisen between the Serbia and the United Nations over the legality of the establishment of the Tribunal for war crimes in the former Yugoslavia,
Considering the Article 96 of the Charter of the United Nations,
For the purposes to determine whether by the delivered above mentioned UN Resolutions, United Nations Security Council has made an ultra vires act(s) in execution of functions and powers not expressly provided for in the United Nations Charter,
And for the purpose to determine further course of action,
Decides to submit the following legal question to the International Court of Justice:
Are the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council 808 (1993) and 827 (1993) legally in accordance with the Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations and provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations?
* Made by the joint team headed by dr. Igor Janev, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Political Studies (Institut za političke studije), Belgrade, Serbia, web posted: 22. 10. 2007.
Appeal for Action of the Government of Serbia
In the case of imposition of the UN resolution providing for “Conditional” or “Postponed” or a “Full“Independence for Kosovo, it is necessary that the Government of Serbia requests that the following Draft Resolution be placed at the next Session of the UN General Assembly:
DRAFT RESOLUTION
The General Assembly
Considering the Article 2 and the Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations,
Considering Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 28. of May, 1948,
Considering the UN Doc. S/1466 of 9. of March, 1950,
Considering the General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, of 1946. and, in particular, the legal character of Article 1. and Article 8 (30),
Taking note that a difference in the legal interpretation of the Charter of the United Nations has arisen between the Serbia and the United Nations over the legality of status for Kosovo and the character of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244. of 1999. and consequently over the interpretation of the General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations and the Membership rights of Serbia and its legal status in the Organization and out of the Organization,
Considering the Article 96 of the Charter of the United Nations,
For the purposes to determine whether by the delivered UN Resolution for status of Kosovo the violation of the United Nations legal character as non-supranational Organization has occurred and consequently violation of Membership rights of Serbia and its legal status in the Organization has also occurred , as well as, violation of the legal order of the Organization and the International legal order, in general
And for the purpose to determine further course of action,
Decides to submit the following legal question(s) to the International Court of Justice:
Is the Resolution for Kosovo of the Security Council (or the General Assembly), relating to the status of Kosovo, legally in accordance with the Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations? In particular, is the Resolution for Kosovo of the Security Council (or General Assembly), relating to the status of Kosovo, in violation of the Membership rights of Serbia, its rights concerning its legal status (in the Organization) and its legal personality, and is this resolution in violation of the legal order of the Organization, and the International legal order in general ?
* Made by the joint team headed by dr Igor Janev, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Political Studies, Belgrade, Serbia , web posted: February 10. 2006.
Legal Freedom in the Choice of Legal Identity of a State
Since the imposed admission conditions on Macedonia and its peculiar legal
status in the UN are related to its name, it is appropriate first to examine the
question of the right of a state to free choice of its own name.
The inherent right of a state to have a name can be derived from the necessity
that a juridical personality must have a legal identity. In absence of such an identity,
the juridical person, such as a state, could to a large extent (or even completely)
loose its capacity to interact with other such juridical persons (e.g. conclude
agreements, etc.) and independently enter into and conduct its external relations.
The name of a state is, thus, an essential element of its juridical personality and,
consequently, of its statehood. The principles of sovereign equality of states24
and the inviolability of their juridical personality25, lead to the conclusion that the
choice by a state of its own name is a basic, inherent right of the state. This right
is not alienable, divisible or transferable, and is a part of the right to ’self-determination’
(determination of one’s own legal identity), i.e. it belongs to the domain
of jus cogens norms. External interference with this basic right is inadmissible.
It is also obvious that if such an external interference with the choice of the name
of a state would be allowed, even through a negotiation process, it might easily
become a legally endorsed mechanism for interference in the internal and external
affairs of that state, i.e. a mechanism for degradation of its political independence.
From these reasons, the choice by the state of its own name must be considered
as an inherent right of the state that belongs stricto sensu to the domain
of its domestic jurisdiction. In exercising this right, the states have, therefore, a
complete legal freedom. This freedom may in practice be constrained only by
considerations of avoidance the overlap of legal identities of two (or more) international
juridical persons. (In this context it should be noted that the province
’Macedonia’ in northern Greece does not represent an international juridical person.)
Based on the principle of separability of domestic and international jurisdiction,
the name of a state, which is subject of that state’s domestic jurisdiction, does
not create international legal rights for that state, nor does it impose legal obligations
on other states. Clearly, the name per se does not have a direct impact on
the territorial rights of states. Therefore, the earlier mentioned Greek allegation
that the name of the applicant implies "territorial claims" has no legal significance.
As mentioned in Section II, the EC Arbitration Commission also took this position
and did not link the name of the country (Republic of Macedonia) to the
Greek territorial rights.26 The same view is shared by prominent scholars of in-
Igor Janev ON THE LEGAL STATUS OF MACEDONIA IN THE UN...
UN Charter, Art
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, GA Res. 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970
See Supra note 18
ternational law (asserting that "no country can have an exclusive right over a name").
27 Interference with matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of a state, such as the choice of state’s name, is also incompatible with the
UN Charter.28 Article 2 (7) of the Charter explicitly extends the validity of this
legal norm to the United Nations themselves.29 It appears, therefore, that neither
the Greek opposition to the admission of Macedonia to UN membership under
its constitutional name, nor the intervention of the UN Security Council in the
matters related to the name of the country, are consistent with the Charter30.
There is, however, an apparent ambivalence in the legal position of UN with
respect to the choice of name of a state. The UN act as mediator in the negotiations
of Macedonia and Greece over the name. During the ten years of negotiations,
besides the obvious lack of success in the negotiation process, the UN have not
exerted any stronger pressure on the parties for resolving more efficiently their
"difference", nor have they tried to impose their own solution to the problem. This
can be interpreted a tacit admission by the UN that the question of determination
of the name of a state is outside of the scope of their legal authority. Indeed, the
name of a state (as an attribute of its legal personality) cannot be related only to
the membership of that state to UN. The legal personality of a state is defined (and
manifest itself) within a much broader frame of international relations, the relation
to UN being only one of many. Entering into UN membership should not affect
the legal identity of a state, since it is established (before and) by factors outside
the relation with UN. In its mediating role in the negotiation process over the
name of Macedonia, the UN apparently observes the principle of non-interference
in matters that are in the domain of state’s internal jurisdiction, but, as mentioned
, that was not the case during the admission procedure.
Legal Status of a UN Member with Imposed Admission Conditions
According to the interpretation of Article 4(1) of the Charter given by the
International Court of Justice in 194831 and accepted by the General Assembly,32
the conditions laid down in that article are exhaustive (and "not merely stated by
way of guidance or example" 33), they must be fulfilled before admission is ef-
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L. Henkin, R.C. Pugh, O. Schachter and H. Smit, "International Law: Cases and
Materials", p. 253 (3rd ed.,
See Supra note 25
UN Charter, Art.
Judge Krylov, in his individual opinion in the ICJ Admission case, (cf. Supra
Note 11) expressed the view that a "Member of the United Nations is not justified
in basing its opposition to the admission [to UN] of a particular State on arguments
which relate to matters falling essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of applicant
State"
See Supra note
See Supra note
See Supra note
fected, and, once they are recognized as having been fulfilled by the Security Council,
the applicant state acquires an unconditional right to UN membership. This
right is enshrined in Article 4 itself and comports with the universal character of
the UN Organization. At the same time, and for the same reasons, the Organization
has a duty to unconditionally admit such a state to UN membership. The Security
Council in the preamble of its resolution34 recognizes that the applicant
state fulfils the required criteria for admission and yet, contrary to the accepted
interpretation of Article 4(1) of the Charter, recommends that the applicant be admitted
to membership with a temporary reference label (to be used for all purposes
within the UN), and imposes an obligation on the future UN member to negotiate
with a neighboring state about its own name. The fact that Security Council
has ignored the strong objection35 of Macedonian Government to such formulation
of its resolution indicates that it considered the added conditions as necessary
for giving the recommendation.
A specific feature of the additional conditions imposed on Macedonia for its
admission to UN membership is that their effect begins with the act of admission.
Their nature is quite different than that of the conditions laid down in Article 4(1)
of the Charter: they need to be fulfilled not before the admission, but after it. These
additional conditions transcend their cause; their nature is obviously not legal,
but rather political. According to the ICJ advisory opinion of 194836, no "political
considerations" can be superimposed on, or added to, the conditions set forth in
Article 4(1) that could prevent admission to membership. The broad nature of the
prescribed admission criteria already provides space for appreciation of all political
factors relevant for the judgment on the fulfillment of these criteria.
With its imposed provisional name (for use within the UN), i. e. with its derogated
legal personality, and its obligation to negotiate with a neighboring country
over its name, Macedonia has a legal status within UN which is obviously
different from that of other member-states. Membership to the UN Organization,
as a legal status, contains a standard set of rights and duties that are equal for all
members of the Organization ("sovereign equality of the Members"37). The admission
of Macedonia to UN membership with additional, non-standard conditions
(that impose on the member certain membership obligations) may be interpreted
as "conditional admission", and, consequently, the resulting membership
status as ’conditional’. The Charter, however, does not provide for conditional
membership in the Organization. Suppose that Macedonia decides at one point
in time not to comply anymore with its membership obligation to negotiate with
Greece over its name. What could be the possible UN sanctions for such noncompliance?
Expulsion from UN membership would only prove that its present
Igor Janev ON THE LEGAL STATUS OF MACEDONIA IN THE UN...
See Supra note 2, preamble
See Supra note
See Supra note
See Supra note
membership status is conditional. Other forms of sanctions would also indicate,
in less evident way, the conditional character of the membership status.
Obstruction of the "settlement of the difference" over the name during the
negotiating process may be another form of non-compliance with the membership
obligation. Such obstruction in the negotiating process may be, however, introduced
also by the other negotiating party (from political, economic or other reasons).
The fulfillment of the imposed admission obligation may, therefore, depend
not only on the good will of the party carrying the obligation, but also on a
factor outside of its control. In fulfilling its membership obligations, Macedonia
is, thus, not independent, which is another difference of its membership status
with respect to the other UN member-states. There is still another important feature
of the legal status of Macedonia as a UN member. By imposing the additional
condition for admission of using a provisional name for the state within the UN,
the legal personality of the future member-state has been heavily derogated by
the very act of admission. The imposition of a provisional name on Macedonia
(for use within the UN system) means that Macedonia was denied the basic (natural)
right to free choice of its name (in internal and even external relations); moreover,
legal identity of this applicant state was suspended by the act of admission,
and replaced by a reference label (denomination). The admission act and resulting
membership status are certainly not consistent with the principle of "sovereign
equality of Members" enshrined in the Charter. The derogated legal personality
of Macedonia in the United Nations system is perhaps most clearly manifested
in the area of representation. In all acts of representation within the UN
system, and in the field of UN relations with other international subjects, the provisional,
and not the constitutional, name of Macedonia is to be used. This is in
violation with the right of states to non-discrimination in their representation in
the organization of universal character, expressed in an unambiguous way in Article
83 of the Vienna Convention on representation of states.38 The right to equal
representation of states in their relations with the organizations of universal character
(such as the UN family of organizations) is (only) a derivative of the principles
of sovereign equality of states within the UN Organization and inviolability
of their juridical personality.
In concluding this section we can summarize that the imposed additional
conditions on Macedonia for its admission to UN membership, in direct violation
of several Charter’s provisions, have created an unusual legal status of Macedonia
in its UN membership. This status is characterized by a drastically derogated
legal personality of the member (through an imposed legal identity), enlarged
membership obligations (the fulfillment of which depend on factors outside of
its control), and unequal rights in the area of representation compared with other
member-states. Even the very nature of membership status is not quite clear, in
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Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with International
Organizations of a Universal Character, UN Doc. A/CONF. 67/16
(March 14, 1975). [See also 69 AJIL 730 (1975)]
view of the imposed sine qua non condition by the act of admission. It is uncontestable
that the principle of ’sovereign equality of the members’ of the Organization
is severely violated in the case Macedonia as UN member. The absence of
any progress in the negotiations with Greece over the name after ten years indicates
that the problem is fundamental in nature. In fact, the dispute over the name
appears to be not between Macedonia and Greece, but rather, in an implicit form,
between Macedonia and the UN. In this dispute Macedonia is defending its right
to (self-) determination of its own legal identity (which is obviously taken as
synonym, or an essential part, of its national identity). Macedonia obviously considers
that right as being sovereign and inalienable, and well grounded in the principles
of existing international law.
Redress of Macedonian Legal UN Membership Status by Juridical
Means
It is obvious that above described legal status of Macedonia in the United
Nations cannot be continued indefinitely. For Macedonia, it is a matter of its dignity,
derogated legal personality, and discriminatory membership position. For
the United Nations, it is an open question on its agenda: a question that was supposed
to be resolved relatively quickly still persists after ten years of negotiations,
with no visible prospects for its solution. It is becoming evident that the
adopted method for settlement of the difference over the name of Macedonia in
the United Nation between Macedonia and Greece by negotiations, with the mediation
of UN, is not producing desired results and new methods for solving this
problem have to be sought. The appropriateness of the method for solving a problem
depends, of course, on the character of the problem. In the UN resolutions
SC Res.817 (1993) and GA Res.47/225 (1993), the Greek opposition to the admission
of Macedonia to United Nations membership under its constitutional name
was taken as sufficient to interpret the "difference" over the name in political
terms (as it has been, in fact, presented by Greece), and, accordingly, to suggest
a "political" method (negotiations) for its settlement. However, the positions of
parties involved in the dispute are so fundamentally different, that no "political"
solution of the dispute can be expected. The political negotiations in the present
case represent a typical example of a "zero-sum" game with no solution acceptable
for both parties.
The whole problem of the legal status of Macedonia in the UN is generated
by the imposed additional conditions (to accept the provisional denomination
FYROM - for use within the UN, and to negotiate with Greece over its name) on
the admission of Macedonia to UN membership in the resolutions SC
Res.817(1993) and GA Res. 47/225 (1993). If one examines the legality of these
resolutions in the light of the provisions of UN Charter, other UN legal documents,
and in particular in the light of the interpretation of Article 4 of the Charter
by the International Court of Justice39 and GA Res.197(III,A) (1948)40, adopting
Igor Janev ON THE LEGAL STATUS OF MACEDONIA IN THE UN...
See Supra note
this interpretation, one arrives at the conclusion that the imposition of additional
conditions on the admission of Macedonia to UN membership is an ultra vires
act of the UN Organization. Indeed, according to the Court’s opinion, adopted by
the General Assembly in 1948, the admission criteria laid down in Article 4 of the
Charter have an exhaustive character: their fulfillment is necessary and sufficient
for admission of a state to UN membership. In the opposite case, "it would lead
to conferring upon the Members an indefinite and practically unlimited power of
discretion in the imposition of new conditions".41 The Court specifically analyzed
the question whether the political organs responsible for the admission have
the power of superimposing "political considerations" to the conditions laid
down in Article 4(1), and concluded that "the political character of an organ cannot
release it from the observance of the treaty provisions established by the
Charter when they constitute limitations on its powers or criteria for its judgment"
42. Therefore, in Court’s opinion, Article 4(1) of the Charter is a legal norm
that fixes the criteria for admission (and also the reasons for which the admission
may be refused) in an exhaustive manner. By virtue of the "openness" of the UN
Organization to membership (enshrined in Article 4 (1) as well) and universal
character of the Organization, once it is recognized that the criteria set forth in
Article 4(1) have been fulfilled by a state, that state acquires an unconditional
right to UN membership, and the Organization a duty to admit such a state. As
mentioned earlier, the preambles of resolutions SC Res.817 (1993) and GA
Res,47/225 (1993) affirm that Macedonia fulfills the prescribed admission criteria,
and yet these resolutions impose the above mentioned additional conditions
on the admission and membership of Macedonia to UN. That the additionally imposed
conditions on Macedonian admission to UN reflect certain "political considerations",
and do not have legal character, follows from the fact that they do
not serve the purpose of admission (prior fulfillment), but are, rather, introduced
by the act of admission and transcend in time that act. Their imposition is clearly
inconsistent with the above described interpretation of Article 4(1) of the Charter
and in contradiction with the General Assembly resolution GA Res.197 (III, A)
(1948) that requires "that each member of the Security Council and of the General
Assembly, in exercising its vote on the admission of new Members, should act in
accordance with the foregoing opinion of the International Court of Justice".43
Therefore, the imposition of additional conditions on Macedonia for its admission
to UN membership constitutes is a violation of Article 4(1) of the Charter as a
legal norm. This circumstance opens a new possibility for resolving the problem
of derogated legal status of Macedonia in the United Nations by juridical means
and the problem of negotiations over the name.
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See Supra note
See Supra note 11, at
See Supra note 11, at
See Supra note
As a mechanism for juridical redress of legal consequences generated by the
violation of Article 4(1) of the Charter in the UN resolutions SC Res.817 (1993)
and GA Res.47/225 (1993), the advisory jurisdiction of the International Court
of Justice appears the most appropriate. The question of legality of these resolutions,
in their parts related to the imposition of additional conditions on Macedonia,
i.e. their compatibility with the provisions of Article 4(1), can be put before
the Court by the General Assembly on request by Macedonia (or jointly with a
group of member states that have already recognized Macedonia under its constitutional
name). Since this question is of purely legal nature, the General Assembly
may request an advisory opinion for it from the Court (in accordance with
Article 96(1) of the Charter)44. The General Assembly cannot obstruct such a request
for an advisory opinion of being put before the Court, because the requested
opinion is related to the legality of its own act. Such an obstruction would mean
that the General Assembly, as a political organ, is imposing its own response to a
question regarding the legality of its own act, or else, imposing its own judgment
in a case in which it itself is a party. Such obstruction would also be incompatible
with the mission and duty of the UN Organization regarding the respect of international
law.45 On the other hand, since the question regarding the legality of imposed
additional conditions on Macedonia for its admission to UN membership
(which could also be formulated in another, but equivalent in meaning and purpose
form) is related to the interpretation of Article 4(1) of the Charter, there cannot
be any uncertainty about the Court’s competence for its consideration. Moreover,
since the question of additional conditions for admission to membership
is only a special case of the more general question on the exhaustiveness of admission
conditions laid down in Article 4(1), already considered by the Court in
1948,46 the Court’s opinion in this case cannot be different from that previously
given. Similarly, the position of the General Assembly with respect to the Court’s
advisory opinion cannot be different than that taken in 1948.
In the history of international organizations, and of the Court itself, this would
not be the first case when the Court is requested to give its opinion on a question
of breach of a constitutional document of the organization by the plenary
organ of that organization. During the elections of new members of Maritime Safety
Committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization
(IMCO) in 1959 by the Assembly of IMCO, the election criteria prescribed in the
IMCO Convention have not been strictly observed. Most of the voting members
of the organization have taken as a basis for their vote additional criteria not expressly
provided for in the corresponding article of the Convention. On request
by two members of IMCO, who contended that in the course of elections their
constitutional rights have been violated, the IMCO Assembly, upon authorization
by the UN General Assembly, put before the Court the question on legality of
Igor Janev ON THE LEGAL STATUS OF MACEDONIA IN THE UN...
UN Charter, Art.
UN Charter, preamble
See Supra note
the elections. The Court delivered its opinion in the negative. The analogy of Macedonian
case with the described IMCO case is very close. The suggested method
for resolving the question of the legal status of Macedonia in United Nations transposes
the problem from the political into the legal arena. Although, the derogated
legal membership status of Macedonia can be most clearly interpreted as violation
of Article 2(1) of the Charter ("sovereign equality of members"), yet its
juridical redress can be most easily effected by invoking the violation of Article
4(1) as most transparent.
It seems advisable that RM requests that the following Draft Resolution be
placed at the Session of the UN General Assembly:
DRAFT RESOLUTION
UN Charter, Art. 96(1).
See Supra note24.The General Assembly
Considering Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 28
May, 1948,
Considering the General Assembly Resolution 197/III of 8 December,
1948,
Considering the General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of
the United Nations, Taking note that a difference in legal interpretation of the
Charter of the United Nations has arisen between "the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia" and the United Nations over the legality of conditions for admission
of that state to membership of the United Nations, and consequently over the
legality of its current status in the Organization, Considering Article 96 of the
Charter of the United Nations,
For the purposes to determine whether additional requirements were imposed
in the procedure of admitting "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia"
to the membership of the United Nations, out of the scope of the exhaustive conditions
of Article 4(1) of the Charter of the United Nations and to determine further
course of action,
Decides to submit the following legal question to the International Court of
Justice: Is the Resolution 47/225 (1993) of the General Assembly, in its part relating
to denomination "The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia", with requirement
for settlement of the "difference that has arisen over the name of the
State" legally in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations? (Particularly,
is the Resolution 817 (1993) of the Security Council, in its parts relating to
denomination "the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia", with requirement
for settlement of the "difference that has arisen over the name of the State" legally
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations?).
Conclusions
The presented analysis of the legal status of Macedonia in the United Nations
has revealed its non-standard form, different than that of all other UN mem-
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bers, and characterized by a severe derogation of its membership rights. This derogation
extrapolates also to the entire legal personality of this UN member, and
its effects extend beyond the UN system. This peculiar legal status is obviously
generated by the additional admission conditions on Macedonia, for which we
argued that represent a breach of Charter provisions. The issue of legal status of
Macedonia in the UN cannot be, apparently, resolved by political means; the negotiations
between Macedonia and Greece over the name seem to be a zero-sum
game: Macedonia associates this name with its national identity, whereas Greece
with its history. To avoid the absurd of potential endless negotiations and a UN
member-state with a continuing provisional name, a practical approach to this
problem would be to resort to the legal means for its solution. If the existing legal
interpretation of Article 4(1) is applied to the UN resolutions related to Macedonian
admission to UN, then the additional admission conditions imposed on Macedonia
constitute violation of this article. The mode of redress via the advisory
jurisdiction of International Court of Justice would then be the most promising
approach to the problem.
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Makedonija ke gi odbie site predlozi na Nimic. Ovie predlozheni varijanti reduciraat problemot od "Dvojna formula" na ednovarijantna formula. So ova se otkriva i zalazhuvachkata priroda na tnr . "Dvojna formula". Taa e izmislena da ne izmami vo poslednite rundi na pregovori.Site od Nimic predlozheni varijanti se neprihvatlivi. Osven Republika Makedonija nemozhe da se, spored ustavot, prihvati bilo shto drugo. Drzavnoto ime e PRAVEN IDENTITET na eden megunarodno -praven subjekt kako sto e drzava. Ottamu nitu edna bukva nesmee da se smeni!!! Vo sprotivno ispaga deka PRAVEN IDENTITET nee inherentnoto pravo na drzava. Ako se konkretno smeni i samo edna bukva, znachi da i bilo koj del od ustavnoto ime e PODLOZHEN na promena. Vakvo nesto podrazbira involviranje na Dignitetot na Drzavata i NEMOZHE da bide prihvatlivo! Edinstven nachin e da se rascisti ovaa situacija preku dobivanjesudskoto mislenje od MSP (ICJ) od Hag za obvrskite okolu referencata (preku Gen. Sobranie na OON).
dr Igor Janev proposed this question of UNGA for ICJ: "Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?".
29.09.2007. Belgrade
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