Тажен јубилеј: Во името на...?

4/08/2006

На денешен ден, пред точно тринаесет години, нашата држава беше примена во ОН, со следниов документ на Генералното собрание. Во документот се наведува дека за сите цели во ОН на нашата држава провизорно ќе се реферира како на "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" - „во очекување на решавање на разликата [спорот] што произлезе во однос на името на државата“.
Во коментарите на еден од претходните постови, беше посочен предлогот на д-р Игор Јанев
за решавањето на меѓународниот „спор“ со името, и беше побарано мое мислење. Еве неколку првични забелешки:
1) Насловот на текстот „Стратегија за враќање на уставното име на Македонија во ОН“, погрешно сугерира дека уставното име на нашата држава е „Македонија“ (а не „Република Македонија“).
2) Насловот на текстот погрешно сугерира дека нашето уставно име некогаш било во ОН (инаку, не би имало смисла да се прави „стратегија за враќање“).
3) Авторот сугерира дека акронимот FYROM по правило се употребува во комуникацијата во ОН иако ниту во погоренаведениот документ, ниту во главните документи на ОН не се употребува FYROM туку провизорната референца "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia".
4) Авторот предлага во „разговорите со Грција за името во ОН“ да го користиме правниот аргумент дека со гласањето за прием во ОН (во Советот за безбедност и Генералното собрание) е прекршена повелбата на ОН, затоа што се поставиле нови услови за прием во ОН. Исто така, авторот смета дека е нужно да се работи на корекциите на илегалноста на тој акт (наместо решавање на консеквенците, треба да се избрише причината). Дали, истовремено, д-р Игор Јанев сугерира аргументи кои би требало да се користат во решавањето на „спорот“ со Грција, и прекинување на наше учество во „спорот“ (затоа што е консеквенца на илегален акт)?
5) Според Јанев, клучно за разрешувањето на проблемот на нашето име во ОН е да се донесе нова резолуција на Генералното собрание, која што ќе ги исклучи дополнителните услови кои и се наметнати на Република Македонија со резолуциите усвоени при нејзиниот прием во ОН. Само во случај ако во догледно време не успее нашето лобирање за вакво политичко решение, Јанев смета дека Македонија би требало да ја стави под прашање легалноста на дополнителните услови пред
Меѓународниот суд на правдата (МСП).
Еве ги моите прашања до оние кои веруваат дека овој суд може да го разреши „спорот“ со аргументите на д-р Јанев:
а) На кој начин ќе ги оспориме „илегалните резолуции“ пред МСП, кога „ниту ОН ниту било која од нејзините специјализирани агенции не можат да бидат страна во спорните постапки пред МСП“?
б) На кој начин ќе ја убедиме другата страна во „спорот“ - ако е тоа Грција - дека овој случај треба да се најде пред МСП, имајќи предвиде дека согласноста на двете страни е исто така еден од условите за прифаќање на случај од страна на судот?
в) На кој начин ќе го убедиме Генералното собрание да донесе нова резолуција (со која ќе ги прогласи за нелегални претходните резолуции) или со посебна резолуција да побара од МСП „советодавно мислење“ за именувањето на нашата држава во ОН?

18 коментари:

GoodBytes рече...

Не смееме да правиме никаква отстапка во врска со нашето име. Единствено може да се бара некое име со кое Грција би не ословувала (бидејќи тоа и да сакаме не можеме да го спречиме).

Се повеќе држави застануваат на наша страна со тоа што не признаваат како Република Македонија. И времето и аргументите се на наша страна.

oksimoron рече...

Проблемот со името во старт не беше наш туку на Грција. Наш стана во моментот кога се согласивме со референцата за прием во ОН. Покажавме политичка и дипломатска невештост. Дозволивме да бидеме изманипулирани од Грција.
Во меѓувреме, голем број на држави не признаа под уставното име. Ако прифатиме преговори сега, кои би резултирале со некаква промена на името во однос на Грција или било кои меѓународни организации - ќе покажеме целосна незрелост и непочитување прво на самите себе си, а и на сите тие кои веќе не признаа под уставното име. Ќе треба ли после и тие во своите држави да носат нови резолуции за промена на веќе признатото име ??!

А за спор пред МСП....:))))))))))
дајте луѓе, никој не може да не одбрани кога веќе еднаш сме признале т.е. сме дозволиле да не именуваат поинаку.
Ние немаме проблем со името, тој проблем ни е наметнат од неспособноста и мекотелоста на политичарите кои прифатиле соседна држава да им влијае на сопствениот идентитет. Сеа, ќе речете дека Глигоров морал да го стори тоа заради наше примање во ОН (под било кое име,еј!) за добро на државата. Јас се прашувам ...дали ако тогаш бевме упорни и принципиелни во своетите убедувања за личниот идентитет и не ја прифатевме фамозната референца - ќе ни беше сеа полошо отколку што ни е??! И, има ли полошо? Има ли подоле од дното на кое сме?
Јас не се согласувам со никакви преговори во однос на името. Најдобро решение би било кога ние како држава самите ја поништиме кај нас во собрание резолуцијата со која ОН не признаваат под референцата ФИРОМ и со тоа го вратиме „проблемот“ на самиот почеток. Ионака залудно ги изгубивме овие 15 години во некаква недефинирана транзиција.
За да сконеме напред, потребен ни е чекор назад за залет. За успешен скок, де. ;)

"Не смееме да правиме никаква отстапка во врска со нашето име." - За жал, отстапките се веќе направени со тоа што нашите политички претставници признале дека има спор во врска со името, и се согласиле да бидеме етикетирани со нешто што нема врска со нашето уставно име.
Никој не може да ја присили државата да учествува во разрешувањето на некој спор во врска со нејзиното уставно име. Никој не може да ги присили државните претставници да го газат нашиот устав ставајќи потпис на меѓународни документи во кои не стои „Република Македонија“. Меѓутоа, 13 години нашите политичари глумат страна во „спорот“ и потпишуваат документи во кои се игнорира нашето уставно име.
Најпесимистички гледано, може да се каже дека Република Македонија ја има изгубено битката со самото тоа што огромен дел од енергијата на надворешната и внатрешната политика последниве 15 години се троши во погрешна насока - за добивање на „битката за името“, наместо за јакнење на институциите и стандардите.
Згора на тоа, синдромот на „жртви“ на разноразни конспирации - вклучително и како страна „Macedonian dispute“ - им дава одлично алиби на сите политичари и натаму да го кршат уставот по разни основи, да ги газат меѓународните закони, и слободно да уживаат во нивните коруптивни дејанија давајќи демократски отчет за своите одлуки од типот „Јебало вас куферче!“

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23 Romanian Journal of Political Science
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE UNITED
NATIONS FOR MACEDONIA`S ACCESSION
TO THE UN
Igor Janev*
Abstract:
In the present article we shall examine the legal consequences of the unlawful
admission of Macedonia to UN membership and the possible ways of judicial reparation.
The emphasis will be placed on the relationship between the rights of states as applicants
or members of the UN Organization, as derived from the Charter, other general UN
documents and the UN legal practices on one side, and the duties of the Organization
relating to those rights (i.e. its adherence to the provisions of the Charter), on the
other hand. Before analyzing in more depth the illegal character and legal effects of the
breaches made by the UN Organization in the process of admitting Macedonia as UN
member and the means of restituting the proper legal status of Macedonia as member
of the United Nations, we shall briefl y account on the problem of legal responsibility of
international organizations (in particular the United Nations) for their unlawful acts (or
omissions), with special attention to those acts that are committed in their relations with
their member states and other international legal persons.
Keywords
UN, Macedonia, FYROM, Greece, reparation, admission, negotiation, UN Charter
*Igor Janev holds a Ph.D. degree and was assistant to the president of the Republic of Macedonia (1998-
1999).
24 Responsibility of the United Nations for Macedonia`s Accession to the UN
1. Introduction
The admission of Macedonia to UN membership in April 1993 by the General
Assembly resolution 47/225 (1993)1, pursuant to the Security Council resolution 817
(1993)2 recommending such admission, was associated with imposing on the applicant
two additional conditions according to those explicitly provided in Article 4(1) of the
UN Charter, namely acceptance (i) of being provisionally referred to as the “Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (for all purposes within the United Nations) and
(ii) of negotiating with Greece over its name.3 These obligations are part of the above
mentioned resolutions, in which it has been also recognized (explicitly in SC resolution
817) that the applicant fulfi lls the standard criteria of Article 4(1) of Charter required
for admission. In a recent paper4 we have analyzed the legal nature of the additional
conditions imposed on Macedonia for its admission to UN membership in the context of
the advisory opinion of International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) given in 1948 regarding the
conditions for admission of a state in the United Nations5 (and subsequently accepted
by the General Assembly6) and concluded that the attachment of conditions (i) and (ii)
to those specifi ed in Article 4(1) of the Charter for the admission of Macedonia to UN
membership is in violation with the Charter.
2. Legal Responsibility of United Nations for Acts Involving their Relations
with Member States
The question of legal responsibility of international organizations for their illegal acts
has been subject of discussions among the legal scholars since the forties and fi fties.7 The
main interest has been focused on the legal effects of such acts and the possibilities of
their judicial redress. In absence of a developed legal practice in the area of international
1 GA Res. 47/225, 8 April 1993 [hereinafter GA Res. 47/225 (1993)].
2 SC Res. 817, 7 April 1993 [hereinafter SC Res. 817 (1993)].
3 After a reference in the preamble to the SC recommendation for admission of the applicant to UN
membership, the General Assembly Resolution 47/225 (1993) states that the General Assembly “[d]ecides
to admit the State whose application is contained in document A/47/876 - S/25147 [i.e. the Republic of
Macedonia] to membership in the United Nations, this State being provisionally referred to for all purposes
within the United Nations as “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” pending settlement of the
difference that has arisen over the name of the State.” The imposed condition for negotiation with Greece
over the name of the applicant is implied in the last part of the decision. Note that this condition imposes
at the same time an obligation to the applicant when admitted to UN membership.
4 Janev, “Legal Aspects of the Use of a Provisional Name for Macedonia in the United Nations System”,
93 AJIL (1999) 155.
5 Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4), ICJ Reports (1948) 57 [hereinafter Admission].
6 GA Res. 197 (III,A), 8 December 1948 [hereinafter GA Res. 197 (III,A) (1948)].
7 Guggenheim, “La Validité et la Nullité des Actes Juridiques Internationaux”, 47 Hague Recueil, (1949)
195-263; see also the volumes of Annuaire de l”Institut de Droit International, 44-I (1952), 45-II (1954), 47-I
(1957), 47-II (1957).
25 Romanian Journal of Political Science
institutional life, the discussions on the matter had so far a predominantly doctrinal
character. With the lapse of time, accumulation of a considerable body of relevant legal
practice took place during the last fi ve decades, which, coupled with the development
and consolidation of certain legal concepts of international law (such as the legal
personality of international organizations, etc.), laid the foundations for development of
a fairly consistent theoretical framework for the treatment and redress of the illegal acts
of international organizations.8 An international organization, as an international legal
person, derives its powers (explicitly expressed or implied) from its constitutional source
and is bound to act only within the limits and in accordance with the terms of the grant
made to it by its members. The most obvious illegal acts that an organization can commit
in exercising its powers and functions are: breach of the constitutional provisions (e.g. by
exceeding its powers), error in the interpretation of constitutional provisions, assertion
of competence by an incompetent organ, improper exercise of a discretion on the basis
of inaccurate or incomplete knowledge or for wrong reasons or motives, implementation
of a decision adopted by a majority but inconsistent with the constitutional provisions,
suspension or expulsion from the organization in absence of proper justifi cation,
wrongful apportionment of expenses among the members, breach of the staff rules and
regulations, etc.9 Unless there are specifi c provisions in the constitutional instrument of
the organization (such as in the case of European Communities10), the effects of the illegal
acts of the organization are governed by the general principles and practice of international
law.11 The United Nations Organization possesses an international legal personality and
the capacity to bring international claims12, but the Charter does not contain provisions
which explicitly address the question of its responsibility for unlawful acts of its organs
and the judicial redress of their consequences. The juridical responsibility of the United
Nations Organization for its own acts is, however, a correlative of its legal personality
and the capacity to present international claims. In the well known Reparation13 case,
the International Court of Justice, asserting the international legal personality of the
United Nations Organization, pointed out that “...the rights and duties of an entity such
as the [U.N.] Organization must depend upon its purposes and functions as specifi ed
or implied in its constituent documents and developed in practice”14, thereby stating
that this organization has certain duties related to its purposes and functions. Although
the International Court of Justice may, according to Article 65(1) of its Statute, offers
8 D.W. Bowett, The Law of International Institutions (4th edn., 1982) 362-365. For a more critical recent review
of this issue, particularly regarding the acts of the Security Council, see Alvarez, “Judging the Security
Council”, 90 AJIL (1996) 1-39, and references therein.
9 Lauterpacht, “The Legal Effects of Illegal Acts of International Organizations”, in Cambridge Essays in
International Law. Essays in honour of Lord McNair (1965) 88-121, at 89.
10 See H. Schermers, D. Waelbroeck, Judicial Protection in the European Communities (4th ed., 1987).
11 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (4th edn., 1990) 701.
12 Ibid., 680-681, 688-690.
13 Reparation for Injuries suffered in the Service of the United Nations, ICJ Reports (1949) 174 [hereinafter Reparation].
14 Ibid., at 180.
26 Responsibility of the United Nations for Macedonia`s Accession to the UN
an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of the General Assembly and
Security Council and/or of any UN body within the UN system upon authorization
by the General Assembly (Article 96 of the Charter), the Court still does not have any
juridical control over the legal effects of the acts of the Organization. The advisory
opinions of the Court have no binding power themselves, but may be (and normally
are) accepted by the bodies requesting them as they induce “moral consequences which
are inherent in the dignity of the organ delivering [them].”15 Exception to this rule is
the General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of
1946 which provides that the opinion specifi ed by the Court (upon the request of the
Organization) regarding differences which could arise between the Organization and a
signatory state shall be binding to the parties.16
In the advisory jurisdiction of the Court there have been only a few cases in which
the relations of United Nations with the states have been involved. In the Reparation and
Mazilu17 cases the request for an advisory opinion was initiated and brought to the Court
by the Organization. In the IMCO18 and Certain expenses19 cases, the request for Court’s
opinion was initiated by the member states (of the IMCO and the UN, respectively). For
the purposes of our further discussion, we shall outline some of the features of these
and of two other cases.
The IMCO case is eloquent in several respects. It is the fi rst case in the history of
international organizations and of the Court itself when the Court was requested to
express its opinion on a question of breach of a constitutional document (the Convention
for the establishment of IMCO) made by the plenary organ (the Assembly of IMCO)
of the organization. Another feature of this case is that the question on legality of
the committed act (the election of the Maritime Safety Committee at the fi rst session
of IMCO Assembly in 1959) was put before the Court by the IMCO Assembly itself
(authorized by the UN General Assembly for such an action) on request by two member
states of the organization (Liberia and Panama) who contended that in the course of
the elections their constitutional rights have been violated (namely, to be automatically
elected in the Committee membership in accordance with the explicitly prescribed criteria
in Article 28 of the IMCO Convention which they have been fulfi lling). What happened
was that during the elections, most of the voting members of the organization have
taken as a basis for their vote additional criteria, not expressly provided for in Article 28
of the Convention, to which they have attached a greater relevance than to those laid
15 Judge Azevedo, in Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania (First phase),
ICJ Reports (1950) 80.
16 General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (13 Feb. 1946), art. VIII, Sect. 30.
17 Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations, ICJ Reports (1989), 177 [hereinafter Mazilu case].
18 Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, ICJ
Reports (1960) 145 [hereinafter IMCO].
19 Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Art. 17, para 2, of the Charter), ICJ Reports (1962) 151 [hereinafter
Certain Expenses].
27 Romanian Journal of Political Science
down explicitly in that article. The Court delivered the opinion “that the Maritime Safety
Committee of IMCO which was elected on January 15, 1959, [was] not constituted in
accordance with the Constitution for the establishment of the Organization.”20
The above opinion of the Court has been accepted by the IMCO Assembly at its next
session. The Assembly resolved that the previously elected Committee should be dissolved
and decided “to constitute a new Maritime Safety Committee in accordance with Article
28 of the Convention as interpreted by the International Court of Justice and its Advisory
Opinion.”21 The Assembly also decided to confi rm and adopt the measures which have
been taken by the previously elected Committee in the period (1959-1961) between the
two Assembly sessions. Without further debating the IMCO case22, we would like to
point out the similar character of the illegal act (breach of a procedural constitutional
provision by the plenary committee of the organization) in the IMCO case with that of
Macedonian admission to UN membership. As we shall see, the legal consequences in the
Macedonian case are much more complex. Nevertheless, the IMCO case may serve as a
model for the juridical redress of the Macedonian case as well.
In the Certain expenses23 case the question put before the Court resulted from the
largely divided views of the UN members regarding the constitutional basis of the
expenditures authorized by a number of General Assembly resolutions for the operation
of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Middle East and for the UN operations in
Congo (ONUC). The division of the UN members in this case was essentially related
to the question of legality of the mentioned operations under the terms of the Charter,
i.e. regarding the validity of corresponding GA resolutions. The request for the Court’s
opinion took the form of whether these expenditures constituted “expenses of the
Organization” within the meaning of Article 17(2) of the Charter. This case illustrates
how the decisions of the General Assembly that are of binding nature represent acts of
the Organization. According to Article 18 of the Charter, such acts of binding nature
of the General Assembly are related to the budget of the Organization and to the legal
status of its members (e.g. admission, suspension and expulsion of members).
In order to further elucidate the relationship between the legal responsibility of
the United Nations Organization and the legal status of its members, we shall briefl y
outline the earlier mentioned Reparation case.24 The question put before the Court in the
General Assembly request for advisory opinion was whether the United Nations, as an
Organization, has the capacity to bring an international claim against a state responsible
(de jure or de facto) for the injuries suffered by an agent of the Organization in
performing its duties. It aimed obtaining reparation due regarding the damage caused (a)
to the United Nations and (b) to the victim (or to persons entitled through him). In the
20 Supra note 18, at 150.
21 IMCO Assembly Resolution A. 21 (II), 6 April 1961.
22 Lauterpacht, supra note 9, at 100-106.
23 Supra note 19.
24 Supra note 13.
28 Responsibility of the United Nations for Macedonia`s Accession to the UN
derivation of its affi rmative response to these questions, the Court fi rst established that
the UN Organization possesses international legal personality, necessary for discharging
its functions and duties on the international plane, that the Charter defi nes the position
of the member states in relation to the Organization (requiring their assistance in the
discharge of Organization’s functions (Article 2(5)), acceptance to carry out its decisions
(and those of the Security Council) and giving the Organization the necessary privileges
and immunities on their territories (Articles 104, 105)), and that the rights and duties of
the Organization are closely related to its functions and purposes as specifi ed or implied
in the Charter. From the facts that the question on the capacity of UN Organization to
bring an international claim against a member state was put in the context of the legal
liability of that state (to pay reparations), and that the Court’s opinion was given in the
affi rmative, it follows that the Charter is an international treaty to which the Organization
effectively is a party and which, by defi ning the mutual rights and responsibilities of the
parties, establishes a contractual relationship between them.25
This is further reinforced by the fact that the Court also invoked the General Convention
on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations which establishes explicitly the
rights, duties and mutual responsibilities among the signatories (the member states) and
the Organization, and even defi nes (Section 30 of Article VIII) the mode of judicial
settlement of the disputes between the different parties. It can be concluded that both the
Charter and the Convention on Privileges and Immunities establish a relationship between
the legal responsibility and the legal status of the international persons involved (the
Organization and the member states). As we have seen, this relationship is of contractual
nature and must involve the juridical liabilities of the parties.
The Mazilu case26 provides a typical example when the legal status of the UN
Organization is violated by a member state. In performing his duties on an UN (ECOSOC)
mission, Mr. Mazilu was deprived from his privileges and immunities by Romania, and
ECOSOC requested the Court for an advisory opinion regarding the applicability of
Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations in the case of Mr. Mazilu. Despite the offi cial objection of Romania
for presenting the request to the Court, the Court has considered the case and delivered
its opinion in the affi rmative. Being requested pursuant Article 96(2) of the Charter,
and not under Section 30 of Article VIII of the Convention (to which Romania had
expressed reservation during its accession to the Convention), the Court’s opinion could
not have a binding force.
The Effects of Awards case27 is an example when the Organization was found liable for
violating the legal status of staff members of the Organization. The question put before
25 The treaty character of the Charter has been also strongly emphasized by the Court in the Admission
case (supra note 5).
26 Supra note 17.
27 Effects of Awards of Compensation made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, ICJ Reports (1957) 47
[hereinafter Effects of Awards].
29 Romanian Journal of Political Science
the Court by the General Assembly was to inquire whether there is any legal ground
for refusing to give effect to an award of compensation made by the United Nations
Administrative Tribunal in favor of a UN staff member whose contract of service has
been terminated without his assent. The Court’s opinion was given in the negative. This
opinion was based on the arguments that a contract of service, concluded between a staff
member and the UN Secretary General, acting on behalf of the Organization, engages
the legal responsibility of the Organization as a juridical person with respect to the other
party, and that, in accordance with Article 10 of the Tribunal’s Statute, the judgment of
the Tribunal is binding to the parties, fi nal and without appeal. This case illustrates that,
when the Organization violates the legal status of its elements (including that of its staff
members as defi ned by the contract of service), the Organization becomes responsible
as a legal person. Since the UN Charter possesses also features of contractual character,
through which the Organization appears as a party, particularly in matters related to the
legal status of its members (in other words, since the legal status of both the Organization
and its member is of contractual origin), it can be concluded that the violation of any
aspect of the legal status of either of them by the other leads to a legal responsibility of
former and involves their legal personalities.
From the above briefl y analyzed cases on which the ICJ has given its opinion, several
conclusions can be drawn:
In discharging its constitutional functions the UN Organization has both rights and
duties expressed in or derived from the constitutional provisions and has a legal
responsibility for their lawful implementation;
The UN Charter, as a multilateral treaty, enables the Organization with an
international legal personality for carrying out its duties and functions, and in the
matters that involve the relations of the Organization (as a legal person) with its
members it acquires features of contractual character (engaging the liability of the
parties);
Breaches of constitutional provisions by the plenary body of the Organization,
related to the rights and legal status of its members, represent unlawful acts of
the Organization (with respect to another international person), for which the
Organization is legally responsible;
For violations by the Organization of the constitutional provisions, particularly the
rights related to the legal status of its member states, the advisory opinion of the
International Court of Justice may serve as an instrument for settlement of the
disputes (in analogy with the IMCO and Effects of Award cases).
1.
2.
3.
4.
30 Responsibility of the United Nations for Macedonia`s Accession to the UN
3. The Unlawful Character of the Admission of Macedonia to UN Membership
As mentioned in the Introduction, Macedonia has been admitted to UN membership
by the General Assembly resolution 47/225 (1993)28 subject to acceptance (i) to be
referred with the provisional name “the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for
all purposes within the United Nations”, and (ii) to negotiate with Greece over its name.
These two conditions for admission of Macedonia to UN membership are additional
to those written explicitly in Article 4(1) of the Charter, which the recommending SC
resolution 817(1993)29 recognizes to be fulfi lled by the applicant. In characterizing the
legality of imposing the above two conditions to the applicant for effecting its admission
to UN membership, three questions should be analyzed:
are the conditions (i) and (ii) indeed additional to those laid down in Article 4(1) of
the Charter, or are they only part of them, or contained in them;
does the conditions provided in Article 4(1) of the Charter form an exhaustive set
of necessary and suffi cient conditions for admission of a state to UN membership,
or can this set be expanded by additional conditions;
are the UN political bodies (the Security Council and the General Assembly) legally
entitled to expand the admission criteria of Article 4(1) of the Charter on the basis
of political considerations?
In order to analyze these questions we remind that Article 4(1) of the Charter
provides: “Membership in the United Nations is open to all other [i.e. other than the
original UN members] peace loving states which accept the obligations contained in the
present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry
out these obligations”. The conditions for admission to UN membership, as expressly
provided in this Article, require that the applicant (1) be a state, (2) be peace-loving,
(3) accepts the obligations of UN Charter, (4) be able to carry out these obligations
and (5) be willing to do so. The fulfi llment of these conditions by the applicant is a
prerequisite for recommending and for implementing the admission and they have to be
satisfi ed, according to UN, prior to the act of admission. The Security Council resolution
817(1993), recommending the admission, recognized that Macedonia had fulfi lled the
above conditions at the time of its application to UN membership.
In order to identify the nature of the conditions (i) and (ii) imposed on Macedonia
by the SC resolution 817 (1993) and the GA resolution 47/225(1993), one should look
fi rst into their functional role, i.e. whether they determine the suitability of the applicant
for membership. The conditions (i) and (ii), however, are imposed as requirements on
the applicant at the moment of its admission to UN membership, and they transcend
in time the act of admission. Such requirements do not correspond to the criteria the
applicant should fulfi ll prior to its admission, but they are, rather conditions which the
28 Supra note 1.
29 Supra note 2.
a)
b)
c)
31 Romanian Journal of Political Science
applicant should accept to carry on and fulfi ll after its admission to membership. The
strong Macedonian objection30 to the inclusion of such conditions in the SC resolution
817(1993) were completely ignored and the admission to UN membership was subjected
to their acceptance. The conditions for admission, imposed on the state by the act of its
admission, and which transcend that act in time, cannot be evidently regarded as part of,
or contained in, those enumerated in Article 4(1), the fulfi llment of which is required
prior to the act of admission. In absence of the institute of “conditional admission”
to the UN membership, the conditions (i) and (ii) must be regarded as conditions
transcending their cause. The additional character of these conditions compared to
those written in Article 4(1) is also obvious from the fact that, as it has been mentioned
earlier, the resolution SC Res. 817(1993) explicitly recognizes that the applicant satisfi es
the conditions for admission prescribed in Article 4(1) and recommends admission. The
very fact that the conditions (i) and (ii) transcend in time the act of admission indicates
that their character is not legal, but they rather have a political nature. At this point, we
would like to emphasize that the imposition of additional conditions (i) and (ii) in the SC
Res. 817 (1993) creates an internal logical inconsistency in this resolution. Apparently, the
motivation for imposing the conditions (i) and (ii) to the admission of Macedonia to UN
membership was the observation by the Security Council that “a difference has arisen
over the name of the State, which needs to be resolved in the interest of the maintenance
of peaceful and good-neighborly relations in the region”.31 This provision implies that
the applicant state is unwilling to carry out the obligation contained in Article 2(4) of the
Charter which requires that the “[m]embers shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”
On the other hand, the recognition contained in SC Res. 817 (1993) that the applicant
state fulfi ls the admission criteria of Article 4(1) means that the Security Council asserts
that the applicant state is a peace-loving state, able and willing to carry out the obligations
in the Charter. Therefore, the two statements in SC Res. 817 (1993) are contradictory to
each other.
The questions (b) and (c) put forward at the beginning of this Section have been
answered by the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in the Admission
case.32 This opinion provides an interpretation of Article 4(1) of the Charter and has
been accepted by the General Assembly.33 The advisory opinion states that a “member
of the United Nations that is called upon, by virtue of Article 4 of the Charter, to
pronounce itself by vote, either in the Security Council or in the General Assembly,
on admission of a state to membership in the Organization, is not juridical entitled to
make its consent dependent on conditions not expressly provided in paragraph 1 of
30 See UN SCOR, 48th Sess., Supp. Apr., May, June, at 35, UN Doc. S/25541 (1993).
31 Supra note 2, preamble.
32 Supra note 5.
Supra note 6.
32 Responsibility of the United Nations for Macedonia`s Accession to the UN
that article”.34 This opinion of the Court was based on the arguments that the UN
Charter is a multilateral treaty whose provisions impose obligations on its members,
that Article 4 represents “a legal rule which, while it fi xes the conditions for admission,
determines also the reasons for which admission may be refused”35, that the enumeration
of the conditions in Article 4(1) is exhaustive, since in the opposite “[i]t would lead to
conferring upon Members an indefi nite and practically unlimited power of discretion in
the imposition of new conditions”36 (in which case the Article 4(1) would cease to be a
legal norm). The conclusion of the Court was that the conditions set forth in Article
4(1) are exhaustive: they are not only the necessary but also the suffi cient conditions for
admission to membership in the United Nations.37
The Court specifi cally addressed the question whether from the political character of
the organs responsible for admission (the Security Council and the General Assembly,
according to Article 4(2)), or for the maintenance of world place and security (Security
Council, according to Article 24 of the Charter), one can derive arguments which could
invalidate the exhaustive character of the conditions enumerated in Article 4(1). The
Court rejected this possibility and held that “[t]he political character of an organ cannot
release it from the observance of the treaty provisions established by the Charter when
they constitute limitations on its powers or criteria for its judgment”.38 Thus, according
to Court’s opinion, the Charter limits the freedom of political bodies and no “political
considerations” can be imposed on, or added to, the conditions prescribed in Article 4(1)
that could prevent admission to membership.
The advisory opinion of the Court also emphasized the functional purpose of the
conditions: they serve as criteria for admission and have to be fulfi lled, in the judgment of
the Organization, prior to the recommendation and the decision for admission.39 Further,
once it has been recognized by the competent UN organs that these conditions have been
fulfi lled, the applicant acquires a (unconditional) right to UN membership.40 This right
follows from the “openness” to membership enshrined in Article 4(1) and from the
universal character of the Organization. In the words of Judge Alvarez, “[t]he exercise
of this right cannot be blocked by the imposition of other conditions not expressly
provided for by the Charter, by international law or by convention, or on grounds of a
political nature.”41
As mentioned earlier, the General Assembly, by its Resolution 197(III, A) of 1948, has
accepted the Court’s interpretation of Article 4(1) of the Charter and recommended that
“each member of Security Council and of the General Assembly, in exercising its vote
34 Supra note 5, at 65.
35 Ibid. at 62.
36 Ibid. at 63.
37 Ibid. at 62
38 Ibid. at 64.
39 Ibid. at 65.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid. at 71.
33 Romanian Journal of Political Science
on the admission of new Member, should act in accordance with the foregoing opinion
of the International Court of Justice.”42 Moreover, in the parts C, D, E, F, G, H, I, of
the same GA Resolution 197(III)43 of 1948, the General Assembly has implemented the
Court’s interpretation of Article 4(1) of the Charter by requesting the Security Council
to provide recommendations for admission of a number of states to UN membership,
the delivery of which was blocked by certain Security Council members on the basis of
arguments (of political nature) not strictly related to the conditions set forth in Article
4(1).
In view of the Court’s interpretation of Article 4 of the Charter as a legal norm
(which should be noticed also by the UN political bodies) and its acceptance by the
General Assembly [the GA Res. 197(III, A)], it is obvious that the imposition of additional
conditions on Macedonia for its admission to UN membership is a clear violation of
Article 4(1) of the Charter. Deriving from the fact that the additional conditions transcend
in time the act of admission (with no specifi ed time limit), it results that their imposition
did not serve the purpose of admission stipulations, but rather a specifi c political purpose.
This indicates that the additional conditions imposed on Macedonia for its admission to
UN membership have no legal character and, by their nature, are extraneous to those
contained in Article 4(1).
The violation of Article 4(1) of the Charter by the General Assembly Resolution
47/225(1993) is not a mere ultra vires act. The imposition of additional conditions to
Macedonia for its admission to UN membership means denial of its right to admission
once it has been recognized that it fulfi lled the exhaustive conditions set forth in Article
4(1). This right is enshrined in the Article 4(1) itself (“Membership in the United Nations
is open to all [other] peace-loving states ....”) and is implied by the principle of universality
of the United Nations Organization. For the Organization itself, the principle of its
universality and the provision for its “openness” to membership create a duty to admit
an applicant to UN membership when it has been recognized that it fulfi ls the criteria set
forth in Article 4(1). Thus, the imposition of additional conditions on a state, that fulfi lls
the prescribed admission conditions, violates the right of that state to become a member
of the Organization and one of the fundamental principles of the Organization as well.
The duty of the Organization to admit states that fulfi ll the conditions of Article 4(1)
to UN membership without imposing additional conditions has been recognized by the
General Assembly, as mentioned earlier.
42 Supra note 6, at 30.
43 GA Res. 197 (III,-C,D,E,F,G,H,I), 8 December 1948.
34 Responsibility of the United Nations for Macedonia`s Accession to the UN
4. Legal Implications and Consequences of the Imposed Admission Conditions
We shall now attempt a more substantial analysis of the additional conditions imposed
on Macedonia by the UN in order to receive UN membership. We reiterate that they include
acceptance by the applicant (i) of “being provisionally referred to for all purposes within
the United Nations as “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” pending settlement
of the difference that has arisen over the name of the state”44, and (ii) of negotiating
with Greece over its name (implied in the second part of the above cited text common
to both GA Res. 47/225(1993) and SC Res. 817(1993) and from the provision in the SC
Res. 817 (1993) by which the Security Council “urges the parties to continue to cooperate
with the Co-Chairman of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on
the Former Yugoslavia in order to arrive at a speedy settlement of the difference”45). The
reason for imposing these conditions was given in the preamble of SC Res. 817(1993) in
which the Security Council, after affi rming that the applicant state fulfi lls the conditions
of Article 4, observes that “a difference has arisen over the name of the State, which
needs to be resolved in the interest of the maintenance of peaceful and good-neighborly
relations in the region”.46 This observation of the Security Council, which has generated
the imposition of the mentioned additional conditions for the Macedonian admission
to the UN membership, was apparently based on the Greek allegation that the name of
the applicant “implies territorial claims” against Greece.47 Without examining the legal
basis of the Greek allegation (see later for details on this aspect), the Security Council,
in accordance with its responsibility for the maintenance of world peace and security
provided for in Article 24 of the Charter, has used the above political consideration as
a suffi cient basis for imposing the additional conditions on Macedonia for its admission
to UN membership. We have already seen that this is not in accordance with the GA
Resolution 197(III, A) and the Court’s interpretation of Article 4(1). However, there are
other, and perhaps even more important, legal implications of the imposed additional
conditions. They are related to the inherent right of states to determine their own legal
identity, to the principles of sovereign equality of states48 and the inviolability of their
legal personality49 and to the legal status (including the representation) of the member
states.
By imposing the conditions on Macedonia regarding its name, the Security Council
and the General Assembly have essentially denied the right of Macedonia to choose its
own name. The inherent right of a state to have a name can be derived from the necessity
44 Supra note 1 and note 2.
45 Supra note 2, para 1.
46 Supra note 2, preamble.
47 See UN SCOR, 48th Sess., Supp. Apr., May, June, at 36, UN Doc. S/25543 (1993).
48 UN Charter, Art. 2 (1).
49 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res. 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970.
35 Romanian Journal of Political Science
that a juridical personality must have a legal identity. In the absence of such an identity,
the juridical person, such as a state, could - to a considerable degree, or even completely
- loose its capacity to interact with other such juridical persons (conclude agreements,
etc) and independently enter into and conduct its external relations. The name of a state
is, therefore, an essential element of its juridical personality and, consequently, of its
statehood. The principles of sovereign equality of states and the inviolability of their
juridical personality lead to the conclusion that the choice of a name is a basic, inherent
right of the state. This right is not alienable, divisible or transferable, and it is a part
of the right to “self-determination” (determination of one’s own legal identity), i.e.
it belongs to the domain of jus cogens. External interference with this basic right is
inadmissible. If this were not true, i.e. if an external factor is allowed to take part in the
determination of the name of a state, under the assumption that the subject state has
at least a non-vanishing infl uence on this determination, it can easily be imagined that
the process of determination of the name of that state (e.g. via negotiations) may never
end. The state may never acquire its name, which would create an extraordinary political
and legal absurd on the international arena. It also goes without saying, that if such
external interference with the choice of name of a state would be allowed, even through a
negotiation process, it might easily become a legally endorsed mechanism for interference
in the internal and external affairs of the state, i.e. a mechanism for degradation of its
political independence. Such effects of an external interference with the right of a state to
choose its own name are very far from the accepted legal standards of international law.
The extreme form of the external interference with the choice of name of a state would
be the straight imposition of the name by an external (e.g. international) authority, which
would simply mean a straight denial of the right of states to choose their own names. It
is easy to foresee that this would lead to either drastic changes of the fundamentals of
presently practiced international law, or to a legal chaos. From these reasons, the choice
by a state of its own name must be considered as an inherent right of the state which
belongs stricto sensu to its domestic jurisdiction. In exercising this right, the states have,
therefore, a complete legal freedom.
The denial by the UN political bodies of the inherent right of Macedonia to choose its
name, implied by the additional conditions imposed for its admission to UN membership,
is, therefore, in violation of Article 2 (paragraphs 1 and 7) of the Charter. The respect of
the principles embedded in this article are equally applicable to the Organization as is to
its members (e.g. Article 2(7) explicitly forbids the Organization to intervene in matters
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the states), and their violation by
the Organization directly involves its legal responsibility.
The violation of Article 2(1) of the Charter and of the principle of inviolability of the
legal personality of states in the process of admission of Macedonia to UN membership
has immediate consequences on its legal status within the United Nations as a member.
Regarding other UN member states, Macedonia is obliged to bear within the UN system
an imposed, provisional name (reference) and to continue to negotiate with Greece
36 Responsibility of the United Nations for Macedonia`s Accession to the UN
over its name. These additional obligations of Macedonia as a UN member distinguish
its position from that of the other UN members and defi ne a discriminatory status.
Membership, as a legal status, contains a standard set of rights and duties, which are equal
for all members of the Organizations (“sovereign equality of the Members”, Article 2(1))
and derogation or reduction of these membership rights and duties for particular states
is inadmissible, particularly in areas which are related to, or involve, the legal personality
of member states. It follows that the additional obligations imposed on Macedonia as a
UN member are again in violation of Article 2(1) of the Charter.
The discriminatory status of Macedonia as a UN member manifests itself in a
particularly clear manner in the area of representation. In all acts of representation
within the UN system, and in the fi eld of UN relations with other international subjects,
the provisional, and not the constitutional, name of Macedonia is to be used. This is
in violation with the right of states to non-discrimination in their representation in the
organizations of universal character (i.e. the UN family of organizations) expressed in an
unambiguous way in Article 83 of the Vienna convention on representation of states.50
That article of the Convention provides that “[i]n the application of the provisions of
the present Convention no discrimination shall be made as between states”.51 The right
to equal representation of states in their relations with the organizations of universal
character is only a derivative of the principles of sovereign equality of the states within
the Organization and inviolability of their juridical personality. The representation on a
non-discriminatory basis, however, has a particular signifi cance in the exercise of the legal
personality of states in their relations with other states or organizations since it involves
in a most direct and explicit way the legal identity of the states.
There is another viewpoint from which the legal status of Macedonia in the United
Nations could be looked at. It can be questioned whether a state admitted to UN
membership under conditions (or obligations), which extend in time with no specifi ed
limit, and which degrade its legal personality, can be considered as a full member of the
Organization (in the sense of the principle of sovereign equality of the members), despite
the fact that the state possess all other rights (and duties) provided by the membership
status? Or, can such a state be considered rather as, de facto, conditionally admitted to
the UN membership? Suppose that the negotiating process may extend indefi nitely. What
would be the legal status of such a member carrying out a permanent obligation? Should
it be expelled from the UN for not complying in an effi cient way with the obligation?
Should the other negotiating party also be expelled from the Organization for the same
reason (assuming that in the negotiations the parties have equal negotiating status)? But,
expelling the state from UN membership for failing to fulfi ll the obligation imposed by
the act of its admission would only prove that the state had been conditionally admitted
to UN membership and that it had a legal status of a conditional member of the United
50 Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with International Organizations
of a Universal Character, UN Doc. A/CONF. 67/16 (March 14, 1975). [See also 69 AJIL (1975) 730].
51 Id. Art. 83.
37 Romanian Journal of Political Science
Nations (a status which is not provided for by the Charter). If expulsion from membership
is not affected, to avoid the conclusion that the membership status of the state was of
conditional nature, then the Organization accepts to tolerate a permanent factual noncompliance
of one of its members with an obligation. It may also be possible that the
obstruction of the “settlement of the dispute” by negotiations is caused not by the party
carrying the admission obligation, but by the other negotiating party. The fulfi llment
of the imposed obligation could, thus, depend not solely on the good will of the party
carrying the obligation, but also on the other party, i.e. on a factor which is outside of
its control. This introduces another component in the legal status of Macedonia in the
UN membership which is related to its independence in carrying out its membership
obligations.
There is still another possible way to look at the legal status of Macedonia as a UN
member. By denial of the right of the state to free choice of its name, and by imposing to
it a provisional name for use within the UN system (i.e. as an attribute to its membership),
the UN organization has essentially suspended the legal identity of one of its members
at the moment and by the act of its admission to membership.52 The suspension of the
legal identity of a member state by the act of admission defi nes a legal status for that state
within the UN characterized by a derogated legal personality and reduced (contractual)
capacity for conducting its international relations both within and outside the UN system.
This specifi c status of Macedonia as a UN member is clearly different from that of all
other member states and is in violation with Article 2(1) of the Charter.
All the above contradictions and inconsistencies in the legal status of Macedonia in
the UN membership have their origin in the violation of the Articles 4(1) and 2(7) of
the Charter by the resolutions of Security Council and the General Assembly related to,
respectively, the recommendation for and effecting of the admission of Macedonia to
UN membership. We shall now reveal the source of these violations.
As indicated earlier, the imposition of additional conditions in the Security Council
Resolution 817 recommending Macedonia for admission to UN membership was based
on concerns regarding “the maintenance of peaceful and good-neighborly relations in the
region”,53 triggered by the Greek allegation that the applicant’s name “implies territorial
claims”54 against Greece. Greece also advanced claims that the right of use of the name
“Macedonia” belongs, for historical reasons, only to Greece. There is, however, no legal
basis for linking the conditions for admission of a state to UN membership, as specifi ed
explicitly in Article 4(1) of the Charter, with allegations based on assumptions regarding
possible future (political) developments. Indeed, based on the principle of separating
domestic and international jurisdiction, the name of the state, which is a subject of
52 In both SC Res. 817 (1993) and GA Res. 47/225 (1993) the name of applicant is not mentioned but
the applicant is referred to as the State whose application is contained in document S/25147 (in the SC
resolution), or in document A/47/876 - S/25147 (in the GA resolution). See also supra note 3.
53 Supra note 2, preamble.
54 Supra note 47.
38 Responsibility of the United Nations for Macedonia`s Accession to the UN
domestic jurisdiction, does not create international legal rights for the state that adopts
the name, nor does it impose legal obligations on other states, which would be a negation
of the basic idea and purposes of international law. Clearly, the name, per se, does not
have an impact on the territorial rights of states.55 Furthermore, from the inherent right
of a state to determine its legal identity, and from the principle that all states are juridical
equal, it follows that all states have an equal legal freedom in the choice of their names.
For this reason, the Greek claim that Greece has an exclusive right to the use of the name
“Macedonia” has “no basis in the international law and practice”.56 The Greek opposition
to the admission of Macedonia to UN membership under its constitutional name is
not only without legal basis, but it is also in violation with the international law when
interfering in matters which are essentially within domestic jurisdiction of Macedonia.57
Thus, by ignoring the principles of separating domestic and international jurisdictions in
the case of Macedonian admission to UN membership, the Security Council has opened
the door for violation of several articles of the UN Charter and for creation of an unusual
membership legal status for one of the UN members, not instituted by the Charter.
5. Legal Responsibility of the UN Organization and Possible Modes of Redress
In the preceding two sections of this study we have provided a number of arguments
which show in a clear way that the inclusion of the two additional conditions in the SC
Resolution 817 (1993) and GA Resolution 47/225(1993), related to the admission of
Macedonia to UN membership, violates the provisions of Articles 4(1), 2(1) and 2(7)
of the Charter and constitutes an ultra vires act of these organs. Since the admission to
membership, effected by a decision of the General Assembly, expresses the legal capacity
of the UN Organization to admit a state to membership, and since a state also has a legal
capacity to become a member of the Organization, it follows that the act of admission
engages the legal personalities of both the Organization and the applicant state, and that
the admission is an act of the Organization.58
As argued in Section 3 above, the responsibility of the Organization related to the
unlawful admission of Macedonia to UN membership derives from the right of the
applicant to admission when it fulfi lls the prescribed criteria laid down in Article 4(1) of
55 The EC Arbitration Commission on Former Yugoslavia, when considering the question of recognition
of Macedonia by the European Community, in its Opinion No. 6 [see 31 ILM (1992) 1507, 1511] has not
linked the name of the country to the Greek territorial rights.
56 L. Henkin et al., International Law: Cases and Materials (3rd edn., 1993) 253.
57 Supra note 49, at 123.
58 The ICJ advisory opinion given in the Certain Expenses case (supra note 19) affi rms that, irrespectively
of the distribution of powers among the organs of the UN organization, the acts of these organs with
respect to a third party represent acts of the Organization. The decisions of the General Assembly made
in accordance with Art. 18(2) of the Charter, including the decisions on admission to membership, have a
binding character.
39 Romanian Journal of Political Science
the Charter, and the duty of the Organization to admit such applicant to membership,
following from the “openness” of the Organization and its mission of universality.59 In
this context, the provisions contained in Article 4(1) should be interpreted as a legal norm
of an international treaty which governs the admission to UN membership.60
Observance of this legal norm is compulsory for the Organization as it is for the
applicant state. The violation of Article 4(1) in the process of admission of Macedonia
to UN membership constitutes, therefore, a breach of the Charter and the constitutionally
guaranteed right of the applicant by the Organization. The specifi c content of the
violation of Article 4(1) is the extension of the admission criteria by the UN political
organs beyond those enumerated exhaustively in that article, i.e. an inappropriate and
politically motivated interpretation of Article 4(1), contradicting the interpretation of the
article given by the International Court of Justice in the Admission case and accepted
(in 1948) by the General Assembly. In this sense, the breach of Article 4(1) of the
Charter by the Organization in the case of Macedonian admission to UN membership is
similar to the IMCO case61, discussed in Section 2, in which the breach of Article 28 of
the IMCO Convention by the Assembly of IMCO was committed similarly because of
an inappropriate interpretation of the provisions of that article (resulting in additional
criteria for election in the IMCO Maritime Safety Committee membership).
As argued in Section 4, the determination of the legal identity of a state is an inherent
right of that state, falling strictly within its domestic jurisdiction. This right, being strongly
correlated with the right to self-determination, belongs to the domain of jus cogens. On
the other hand, the legal identity is an essential element of the legal personality of a state,
the inviolability of which has again character of a jus cogens norm. The denial of the
right of a state to determine its own name is, therefore, in violation with the norms of
jus cogens, refl ected in the provisions of Articles 1(2), 2(1) and 2(7) of the Charter and
in the Declaration on Principles of International Law.62 The Organization, as any other
subject of international law, has a duty to respect these norms. Articles 2(7) specifi cally
and expressly limits the powers of the Organization over matters from the strict internal
jurisdiction of the states. The breach of this article in the case of Macedonian admission
to UN membership, by interfering in the inherent right of this state to choose its own
name, is certainly an ultra vires act of the Organization. The Organization bears a legal
responsibility for this unlawful act. Since the basic principles embodied in the Charter
are mutually interrelated and consistent with each other, breach of one principle (or legal
59 The correlation between the rights of a state, fulfi lling the conditions laid down in Art. 4(1), to admission
to UN membership and the duty of the Organization to admit such a state to membership was
elaborated in detail in the ICJ advisory opinion given in the Admission case (supra note 5). Particularly
clear form of this correlation was given in the concurring individual opinion of Judge Alvarez (Ibid., at
71).
60 This interpretation of Art. 4(1) was given by the ICJ in the Admission case (supra note 5, at 62) and was
accepted by the General Assembly (see supra note 6).
61 Supra note 18.
62 Supra note 49.
40 Responsibility of the United Nations for Macedonia`s Accession to the UN
norm) leads, usually, to violation of other principles (or norms). Thus, the violation of
Article 2(7) leads also to violation of the principle enshrined in Article 2(1), as generalized
by the Declaration on Principles of International Law (“sovereign equality of states”63),
and vice versa. Furthermore, the violation of Articles 4(1) and 2(7) during the process
of admission leads to a discriminatory legal status of Macedonia as a UN member,
i.e. to violation of Article 2(1) of the Charter. (Indeed, ex injuria jus non oritur). As
we have argued in the preceding section, the breach of this article results effectively in
suspension of the legal identity of the member state, infl icting thus a grave damage on
its legal personality (e.g. by reducing its contractual capacity, its capacities in the domains
of legation and representation, etc), and on its external political and economic relations.
The responsibility of the Organization for violating Article 2(1) derives from its duty to
strictly observe this treaty provision (principle of the Organization), and from its mission
in promoting the legal justice and the rule of international law.64
The violations of Charter provisions contained in Articles 4(1), 2(1) and 2(7) may
each serve as a suffi cient legal basis (ultra vires acts) for requesting a judicial redress,
i.e. for removal of the conditions imposed on Macedonia during its admission to UN
membership and the resulting discriminatory legal status as a UN member. On the
substantive level, however, they are all closely interrelated (as argued above), since the
violation of Articles 2(1) and 2(7) underlines the violation of Article 4(1). On the other
hand, the breach of Article 4(1) (which implies the violations of Articles 2(1) and 2(7))
appears to be the source generating the problems related to the specifi c legal status of
Macedonia in the UN membership. Further, the breach of Article 4(1) appears to be
most obvious, since the admission of Macedonia to UN membership has not followed (in
its substantive part) the standard admission procedure. Moreover, this breach is in direct
discord with the General Assembly resolution 197 (III, A) regarding the interpretation of
Article 4(1) given by the International Court of Justice in the Admission case.65
As a mechanism for judicial redress of legal consequences generated by the violation
of Article 4(1) in General Assembly resolution 47/225 (1993) and Security Council
resolution 817 (1993), the advisory jurisdiction of International Court of Justice appears
to be the most appropriate in this case. The question of legality of these resolutions in
their parts related to the imposition of additional conditions on Macedonia regarding its
name for its admission in UN membership (i.e. their compatibility with the provisions
of Article 4(1) of the Charter) could be put before the Court by the General Assembly
on request by Macedonia (possibly jointly with a group of Member States that have
already recognized Macedonia under its constitutional name). Since this question is of
purely legal nature, the General Assembly may request for it an advisory opinion from
the Court (Article 96(1) of the Charter). The General Assembly cannot obstruct such
a request for an advisory opinion of being put before the Court because the requested
63 Ibid., at 122.
64 UN Charter, preamble.
65 Supra note 5.
41 Romanian Journal of Political Science
opinion is related to the legality of its own act. Such an obstruction (based on whatever
reasons) would essentially mean that the General Assembly, as political organ, is imposing
its own response to the question regarding the legality of its own act, or, imposing its
own judgment in a case in which it is itself a “party” (representing the Organization).66
This would be incompatible with the basic legal principles of juridical equality and bona
fi de, and with the mission and the duty of the UN Organization regarding the respect
of international law.67 Moreover, the earlier discussed IMCO case68 provides an example
in which the Organization has not obstructed the request for a Court’s advisory opinion
regarding the compatibility of a decision of IMCO plenary organ with the provisions of
its constitutional document. On the other hand, since the question regarding the legality
of imposing additional conditions on Macedonia for its admission to UN membership
is essentially a special case of the more general question (of the same character) already
considered by the Court in the Admission case69, there cannot be any uncertainty about
the Court’s competence for its consideration. For the same reason, and from the
obvious incompatibility of the additional conditions for Macedonian admission to UN
membership with the exhaustive character of the conditions set forth in Article 4(1) of
the Charter, the Court’s advisory opinion in this case cannot be different from its opinion
already given in the Admission case. Similarly, the position of the General Assembly
with respect to the Court’s opinion in the Macedonian case cannot be different from its
position70 taken with respect to the Court’s opinion in the Admission case. In fact, the
Macedonian case is only a specifi c example of the general issue considered by the Court
in the Admission case, created by the non-observance (or neglect) of already adopted
Court’s interpretation of Article 4(1) of the Charter.71
The mode of redress via the advisory jurisdiction of the Court includes also the more
subtle problem of the legal consequences of legally defective GA resolution 47/225
(1993). Apart from its preamble (referring to the recommendation of the Security
Council for admitting the applicant to UN membership with additional conditions and to
the application of the candidate), the GA resolution 47/225 (1993) contains a decision
which includes two parts: (a) to admit the applicant State to membership in the United
Nations, and (b) “this State being provisionally referred to for all purposes within the
United Nations as “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” pending settlement of
66 As we have argued earlier, in the act of admission of a state to UN membership the legal personalities
of both the Organization and the applicant state are involved.
67 Supra note 64.
68 Supra note 20.
69 The question for which an advisory opinion of the Court was requested by the General Assembly
had the form: “[i]s a Member of the United Nations which is called upon, in virtue of Article 4 of the
Charter, to pronounce itself by its vote, either in the Security Council or in the General Assembly, on the
admission of a State to membership in the United Nations, juridical entitled to make its consent to the
admission dependent on conditions not expressly provided by paragraph 1 of the said Article?” (See GA
Res. 113(II), 14 November 1947).
70 Supra note 6.
71 Ibid.
42 Responsibility of the United Nations for Macedonia`s Accession to the UN
the difference that has arisen over the name of the State”.72 Part (a) of the GA resolution
refl ects the assessment of Security Council that “the applicant fulfi lls the criteria for
membership laid down in Article 4 of the Charter73 and follows the Security Council
recommendation for admission of the applicant state to UN membership. Part (b) of
the GA resolution contains the imposed additional conditions related to the name of the
applicant (and future UN member) without the acceptance of which part (a) could not
have been affected. Only part (b) of the GA resolution is ultra vires and only this part
can be considered as void. From the requirement of legality, the unlawful part (b) of the
GA resolution should be considered as void ab initio. However, practical consideration
(within the General Assembly, after the favorable Court’s advisory opinion is received
and presumably adopted) may render the determination that part (b) of the resolution is
void ex nunc.74 In either case, according to the principle of severability75, the invalidation
of part (b) of the resolution should not affect the validity of part (a). Obviously, the
invalidation of part (b) of GA Res. 47/225 (1993) can be done by a new GA resolution,
which would also affi rm the use of constitutional name of Macedonia within the UN
system.
Another basis for a judicial redress in the Macedonian case via the advisory jurisdiction
of International Court of Justice could be based on the violation of Article 2(1) of the
Charter in GA Res. 47/225 (1993) by which the legal personality of the state is severely
derogated (through suspension of its legal identity and imposing a discriminatory
membership status). The question of derogation of legal personality of Macedonia by
this GA resolution, in the context of Article 2(1), has an obvious legal character and
is, therefore, a legitimate subject for the Court’s advisory jurisdiction. Since some of
the basic principles of international law are involved in the subject (related, e.g., to the
inherent rights of states, inviolability of legal personality, equality of states, etc), the Court
cannot formulate its opinion in a manner inconsistent with those principles. Nor could
the General Assembly ignore the Court’s opinion based on such principles.
6. Summary
We have presented a detailed analysis of the legal aspects of SC Res. 817 (1993) and GA
Res. 47/225 (1993) which are related to the admission of Macedonia to UN membership.
It has been demonstrated that the additional conditions imposed on Macedonia for its
72 Supra note 1. The formulation of part (b) of GA Res. 47/225 (1993) is identical with the formulation
given in the recommendation of the Security Council resolution SC Res. 817 (1993). The SC resolution,
however, somewhat expands on the character of the “difference” and on its settlement by negotiations
(see supra note 45).
73 Supra note 2, preamble.
74 Such a determination was given, for instance, by the Assembly of IMCO when accepting and implementing
the Court”s advisory opinion (see supra note 21).
75 Supra note 9, at 120.
43 Romanian Journal of Political Science
admission to the United Nations constitute a clear violation of Articles 4(1), 2(1) and 2(7)
of the Charter, and defi ne a discriminatory legal status of the state as a member (again
in violation of Article 2(1)). The responsibility of the United Nations Organization for
violation of Charter’s provisions derives from the duty of the Organization to respect the
basic rights of the states (either as applicants to UN membership, or as UN members),
which are protected by the principles of international law enshrined in the mentioned
articles of the Charter. The character of these violations is of the ultra vires type with
respect to the legal norms of the Charter as a multilateral treaty. The violations of
Articles 4(1), 2(1) and 2(7) involve the legal personalities of both the Organization and
the Macedonian state. This provides a basis for instituting a judicial redress of the legal
consequences resulting from the breach of constitutional provisions. We have discussed
two possible pathways for such judicial redress, based on the violation of Article 4(1)
and Article 2(1), respectively, and on the use of the advisory jurisdiction of International
Court of Justice.

Анонимен рече...

Dr Igor Janev, American Journal of International Law, Vol.93, no. 1, January 1999


LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE USE OF A PROVISIONAL
NAME FOR MACEDONIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

The admission of Macedonia to membership in the United Nations in April 1993 required the new member to be “provisionally referred to for all purposes within the United Nations as ‘the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ pending settlement of the difference that has arisen over the name of the State.”1 The term “difference” here refers to the dispute between Greece and Macedonia over the use of the applicant state’s name. In its Resolution 817 of April 7, 1993 (by which the applicant state was recommended for admission to the United Nations), the Security Council “urge[d] the parties to continue to cooperate with the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia in order to arrive at a speedy settlement of their difference.”2 Thus, the admission of Macedonia to the United Nations was subject to its acceptance of being provisionally referred to as the “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (FYROM) and of negotiating with Greece over its name. I will examine the nature and legal basis of these requirements with respect to the conditions laid down in Article 4 of the UN Charter for the admission of states to the Organization.
The conditions for the admission of states were the subject of exhaustive political and legal deliberations at the United Nations during the 1940s when many states were applying for membership.3 During the first several years of the Organizations’ existence, admission to, and even representation in, the United Nations were subject to various conditions (outside the scope of those contained in Article 4 of the Charter), which in some cases required recognition of the applicant (as an international subject) prior to its admission to membership.4

In an effort to resolve the dilemmas regarding the legal aspects of the conditions required for admission to membership and to eliminate the various stalemates that were occurring in the admission process, the UN General Assembly, by Resolution 113 (II) of

November 17, 1947, requested that the International Court of Justice give an advisory opinion on the following question:
Is a Member of the United Nations which is called upon, in virtue of Article 4 of the Charter, to pronounce itself by its vote, either in the Security Council or in the General Assembly, on the admission of a State to membership in the United Nations, juridically entitled to make its consent to the admission dependent on conditions not expressly provided by paragraph 1 of the said Article? 5
The following conditions are expressly set forth in Article 4, paragraph 1 of the UN Charter, which provides: “Membership in the United Nations is open to all other [i.e., other than the original UN members] peaceloving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.” The next paragraph of the article states the procedural rule that “[t]he admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.”

In its Advisory Opinion, Admission of a State to the United Nations, the Court first concluded that the question put to it in an abstract form had a legal nature. Consequently, the Court was required to provide an interpretation of Article 4, paragraph 1 of the Charter and, by virtue of Article 96 of the Charter and Article 65 of its Statute and as “the principal judicial organ of the United Nations,” it had the competence to give such an interpretation. The Court then observed that paragraph 1 of Article 4 in effect contains five conditions; to be admitted to membership in the United Nations, an applicant must (1) be a state; (2) be peace-loving; (3) accept the obligations of the UN Charter; (4) be able to carry out these obligations; and (5) be willing to do so. Further, the Court found that the question put to it by the General Assembly could be reduced to the following:
are the conditions stated in paragraph 1 of Article 4 exhaustive in character in the sense that an affirmative reply would lead to the conclusion that a Member is not legally entitled to make admission dependent on conditions not expressly provided for in that Article, while a negative reply would, on the contrary, authorize a Member to make admission dependent also on other conditions.6

After thorough consideration, the International Court of Justice formulated its advisory opinion stating that a member of the United Nations that is called upon, by virtue of Article 4 of the Charter, to pronounce itself by its vote, either in the Security Council or in the General Assembly, on the admission of a state to membership in the Organization, is not juridically entitled to make its consent dependent on conditions not expressly provided in paragraph 1 of that article.7
Among the most important arguments used by the Court in arriving at the above opinion were that (1) the UN Charter is a multilateral treaty whose provisions impose obligations on its members; (2) the text of paragraph 1 of Article 4, “by the enumeration which it contains and the choice of its terms, clearly demonstrates the intention of its authors to establish a legal rule which, while it fixes the conditions of admission, determines also the reasons for which admission may be refused”;8 and (3) the enumeration of the conditions in paragraph 1 of Article 4 is exhaustive (and “not merely stated by way of guidance or example”9), which follows from the fact that if the opposite were the case, “[i]t would lead to conferring upon Members an indefinite and practically unlimited power of discretion in the imposition of new conditions.”10

In its deliberations, the Court specifically analyzed whether the political character of the organs responsible for admission (the Security Council and the General Assembly, by virtue of paragraph 2 of Article 4), or for the maintenance of world peace (the Security Council, pursuant to Article 24 of the Charter), engendered arguments leading to the contrary conclusion regarding the exhaustive character of the conditions enumerated in paragraph 1 of Article 4. The Court rejected this interpretation and held that “[t]he political character of an organ cannot release it from the observance of the treaty provisions established by the Charter when they constitute limitations on its powers or criteria for its judgment.”11 Thus, the Charter limits the freedom of political organs and no “political considerations” can be superimposed on, or added to, the conditions set forth in Article 4 that could prevent admission to membership. This does not mean, however, that the conditions of Article 4 preclude taking into account relevant political factors that fall within their scope. Appreciation of such factors derives from the very broad and elastic nature of

the prescribed conditions and, according to the Court, it does not contradict the exhaustive character of these conditions.
The advisory opinion of the Court makes it apparent that, besides their exhaustive and explicit character, the conditions laid down in Article 4 of the Charter have two additional characteristics: (1) they must be fulfilled before admission is effected; and (2) once they are recognized as having been fulfilled, the applicant state acquires an unconditional right to UN membership. This last feature also follows from the “openness” to membership enshrined in Article 4, which comports with the universal character of the Organization.12

The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice was presented to the General Assembly at its third session, in December 1948. At that session the General Assembly adopted Resolution 197 (III), by which it “[r]ecommend[ed] that each member of the Security Council and of the General Assembly, in exercising its vote on the admission of new Members, should act in accordance with the foregoing opinion of the International Court of Justice.”13

This resolution and the Court’s advisory opinion have direct legal relevance to the issue of the admission of Macedonia to membership in the United Nations, since these documents interpret the Charter in a manner that limits the power of the UN organs to impose conditions on admission. The preamble to Security Council Resolution 817, by which Macedonia was recommended for admission, recognized that “the applicant fulfils the criteria for membership laid down in Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations.”14 According to Admission of a State to the United Nations and General Assembly Resolution 197, this statement means that the applicant has fulfilled all the required conditions for admission to membership in the United Nations and that no other conditions may be imposed. Contrary to the usual wording of Security Council resolutions recommending admission of a state, Resolution 817, after recognizing the fulfillment of the conditions in Article 4, contains an additional consideration, “that a difference has arisen over the name of the State, which needs to be resolved in the interest of the maintenance of peaceful and good-neighbourly relations in the region.”15 This condition, which is found in the

introductory part of the resolution, is reflected in its paragraph 2, which recommends the admission of the applicant state to membership in the United Nations. It describes “this State” as “being provisionally referred to for all purposes within the United Nations as ‘the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ pending settlement of the difference that has arisen over the name of the State.” The Macedonian Government strongly objected to the use of this provisional name,16 stating that “under no circumstances” was it prepared to accept that designation as the name for the country. Nevertheless, the text of the resolution remained unchanged. As a consequence, the imposed obligation to accept this provisional denomination and the closely related obligation to negotiate over the name of the country served as additional conditions that it was required to satisfy so as to gain admission to the United Nations.
These unusual conditions in Resolution 817 are extraneous to the limited list laid down in Article 4. Furthermore, these conditions transcend the act of admission in time. Since the Charter makes no provision for other conditions for admission, it appears that the conditions imposed on Macedonia have no legal basis. Certainly, the ICJ’s advisory opinion makes clear that all the conditions for admission to membership must be fulfilled before admission is effected. Since the conditions that were imposed represent purely political considerations, they are incompatible with the letter and spirit of the UN Charter.
Also relevant is the fact that Security Council Resolution 817, after explicitly recognizing that the applicant state had “fulfil[led] the criteria for membership laid down in Article 4,” recommended to the General Assembly that the state be admitted. The act of recommendation necessarily recognized that the conditions of Article 4 had been fulfilled. The additional conditions that were attached to the recommendation of Macedonia for membership in the United Nations therefore created a logical inconsistency because the Charter contains a closed list of requirements. Once those requirements are found to have been satisfied, the state has a right to admission. Additional conditions attached by the Security Council and General Assembly appear to negate the conclusion that the state is entitled to admission in accordance with the Charter conditions that were met.



Thus, the recognition of its fulfillment of the conditions for admission means that the Security Council affirmed that the applicant country is a peace-loving state, able and willing to carry out the obligations in the Charter, which include (among others) the obligation set forth in Article 2, paragraph 4: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” On this basis, it appears contradictory and incompatible with the law for the Security Council resolution to report that “a difference has arisen over the name of the State, which needs to be resolved in the interest of the maintenance of peaceful and good-neighbourly relations in the region.” This provision implies that the applicant state is unwilling to carry out the obligation contained in Article 2, paragraph 4. The ICJ’s above-mentioned advisory opinion and General Assembly Resolution 197 do not permit such contradictory statements--either the test for admission is met or it is not. The principles of exhaustiveness, explicitness, prior fulfillment and recognition, which are embedded in the Court=s interpretation of the conditions of Article 4 of the Charter, must mean that it would be logically inconsistent for additional conditions to be attached to the resolutions that recommend or the decisions that provide for the admission of a state.
It can be argued that the logic of the Court’s opinion also relates to the provision in Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, which states: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter.”

Thus, in interpreting this paragraph in connection with the admission of states to membership in the United Nations, Judge Krylov (who took part in the 1948 ICJ proceedings) stated that a “Member of the United Nations is not justified in basing [its] opposition to the admission of a particular State on arguments which relate to matters falling essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the applicant State.”17 This statement reiterates the principle, embedded in the advisory opinion of the Court and in General Assembly Resolution 197, that, once the appropriate UN organs determine that the criteria

of Article 4 have been fulfilled, neither a UN organ nor a member of the Organization can condition the admission of the applicant state on any additional consideration, particularly if it essentially falls within that state’s domestic jurisdiction. Certainly, the name a state wishes to adopt is a domestic matter, having no direct impact on any other state.

Furthermore, on the basis of the principle of separability of domestic and international jurisdiction, it can be argued that the substantive Greek allegation that the name of the applicant implies “territorial claims” has no legal significance. Obviously, the name of a state, which is a subject of that state’s domestic jurisdiction (since every state naturally has an inherent right to a name), does not create international legal rights for the state that adopts the name, nor does it impose legal obligations on other states. Clearly, the name, per se, does not have a direct impact on the territorial rights of states. Greece advanced practically the same objections and demands as regards the recognition of Macedonia by the members of the European Community. Nevertheless, the EC Arbitration Commission on former Yugoslavia did not link the name of the country (Republic of Macedonia) to Greek territorial rights.18 Prominent scholars of international law have expressed similar views. For instance, in their course book on international law, Professors Henkin, Pugh, Schachter and Smit observe that there “appears to be no basis in international law or practice” for the Greek demand that Macedonia change its name, “claiming that the right to use that name should belong exclusively to Greece.”19 It is apparent that the Greek demands regarding the name of Macedonia are motivated mainly by concern that the admission to the United Nations of a state with that name may add strength in the political arena to possible Macedonian claims to Greek territory. The name itself has no legal bearing on such a potential dispute and no relevance to the qualifications that may legally be considered in connection with the admission of a state to the United Nations.
To nullify the Greek concerns that the name of the country implies territorial claims against Greece, Macedonia adopted two amendments to its Constitution on January 6, 1992. They assert that Macedonia “has no territorial claims against any neighboring states”; that its borders can be changed only in accordance with the Constitution and “generally accepted international norms”; and that, in exercising care for the status and rights of its citizens and

minorities in neighboring countries, it “shall not interfere in the sovereign rights of other States and their internal affairs.”20 It can further be noted that after the two countries concluded the Interim Accord of September 13, 1995, under the auspices of the United Nations, their relations entered into a period of steady and progressive development.

From the point of view of legal theory, the inherent right of a state to have a name can be derived from the necessity for a juridical personality to have a legal identity. In the absence of such an identity, the juridical person (such as a state) could--to a considerable degree (or even completely)--lose its capacity to conclude agreements and independently enter into and conduct its relations with other juridical persons. Therefore, the name of a state appears to be an essential element of its juridical personality and its statehood. The principles of the sovereign equality of states21 and the inviolability of their juridical personality 22 lead to the conclusion that the choice of a name is an inalienable right of the state. In this context, external interference with this basic right appears to be inadmissible, irrespective of territorial and similar arguments. This conclusion is consistent with the previously cited opinion of Henkin, Pugh, Schachter and Smit that states have no exclusive rights to names under international law. Perhaps the international community should develop appropriate legal mechanisms and rules for hypothetical situations when two or more states wish to adopt the same name. This is not the case in the Greek-Macedonian dispute, however, since the name “Macedonia” is used by Greece to designate one of its provinces (which is not an international legal person).
The question of a juridical linkage between the conditions for admission to UN membership and the conditions for recognition of a state was deliberated in the United Nations at the beginning of the 1950s. A memorandum on legal aspects of representation in the United Nations23 was prepared by the Secretariat and communicated to the Security Council. The memorandum emphasized that the recognition of a state and its admission to UN membership are governed by different rules. Recognition is essentially a “political” decision of individual states, whereas admission to membership is a collective act of the General Assembly based on the right to membership of any state that meets the prescribed criteria. Therefore, there is no link--juridical or otherwise --between the conditions for

recognition of a state by another state and the conditions for admission as a member to the United Nations. On this basis, the memorandum stressed that it is inadmissible to condition admission on recognition, since admission does not imply recognition by any government.24 This conclusion is consistent with the previously discussed advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice and with the principle of universality of the United Nations.

In conclusion, once the conditions set forth in Article 4 of the UN Charter have been fulfilled, the applicant state acquires an inalienable right to UN membership. On the basis of the Security Council’s assessment that Macedonia had satisfied the conditions of Article 4 and General Assembly Resolution 197 regarding observance of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, it appears that the Macedonian application for membership should have been handled in accordance with the existing standard admission procedure and law. The additional conditions related to the name of the state constitute violations of the Charter.



Notes
1|SC Res. 817, UN SCOR, 48th Sess., Res. & Dec., at 132, para. 2, UN Doc. S/INF/49 (1993); GA Res. 47/225, UN GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, Vol. 2, at 6, UN Doc. A/47/49 (1993).
2|SC Res. 817, supra note 1, para. 1.
3|See, e.g., UN SCOR, 1st Sess., 2d series, Supp. 4, at 40, 47, 53 (1946); id., 2d Sess., Spec. Supp. 3, 29, 35-36, 42, 51-53 (1947).
4|See UN SCOR, 2d Sess., 181st mtg. at 1920, 1935 (1947); id., 3d Sess., 330th mtg. at 16 (1948).
5|GA Res. 113 (II), UN GAOR, 2d Sess. Res., at 19 (1947).
6|See Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4), Advisory Opinion, 1948 ICJ REP. 57, 61 (May 28).
7|Id. at 65.
8|Id. at 62.
9|Id.
10|1948 ICJ REP. at 63 (in which case paragraph 1 of Article 4 would cease to be a legal norm). It follows that the conditions laid down in paragraph 1 of Article 4 are not only necessary, but also sufficient conditions for admission to membership in the United Nations.
11|Id. at 64.
12|This view of the Court was elaborated specifically and in depth by Judge Alvarez in his concurring individual opinion. He stated that,

having regard to the nature of the universal international society, the purposes of the United Nations Organization and its mission of universality, it must be held that all States fulfilling the conditions required by Article 4 of the Charter have a right to membership in that Organization. The exercise of this right cannot be blocked by the imposition of other conditions not expressly provided for by the Charter, by international law or by a convention, or on grounds of a political nature.

Id. at 71.
13|GA Res. 197 (III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., Res., pt. 1, at 30 (1948).
14|SC Res. 817, supra note 1, preamble.
15|Id.
16|See UN SCOR, 48th Sess., Supp. for Apr.-June, at 35, UN Doc. S/25541 (1993).
17|Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4), Advisory Opinion, 1948 ICJ REP. 57, 113 (May 28) (Krylov, J., dissenting).
18|See EC Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 6, 31 ILM 1507, 1511 (1992).
19|LOUIS HENKIN, RICHARD C. PUGH, OSCAR SCHACHTER & HANS SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 253 (3d ed. 1993).
20|For an English translation of the Macedonian Constitution, including amendments, see 11 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD & Supp. 98-6, at 1 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1994, 1998).
21|UN CHARTER Art. 2, para. 1.
22|Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res. 2625 (XXV), UN GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, 123, 124, UN Doc. A/8028 (1970).

23|Memorandum on legal aspects of the problem of representation in the United Nations, UN Doc. S/1466, at 2 (1950).
24|Id. at 3.

Анонимен рече...

Dr Igor Janev, American Journal of International Law, Vol.93, no. 1, January 1999


LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE USE OF A PROVISIONAL
NAME FOR MACEDONIA IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

The admission of Macedonia to membership in the United Nations in April 1993 required the new member to be “provisionally referred to for all purposes within the United Nations as ‘the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ pending settlement of the difference that has arisen over the name of the State.”1 The term “difference” here refers to the dispute between Greece and Macedonia over the use of the applicant state’s name. In its Resolution 817 of April 7, 1993 (by which the applicant state was recommended for admission to the United Nations), the Security Council “urge[d] the parties to continue to cooperate with the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia in order to arrive at a speedy settlement of their difference.”2 Thus, the admission of Macedonia to the United Nations was subject to its acceptance of being provisionally referred to as the “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (FYROM) and of negotiating with Greece over its name. I will examine the nature and legal basis of these requirements with respect to the conditions laid down in Article 4 of the UN Charter for the admission of states to the Organization.
The conditions for the admission of states were the subject of exhaustive political and legal deliberations at the United Nations during the 1940s when many states were applying for membership.3 During the first several years of the Organizations’ existence, admission to, and even representation in, the United Nations were subject to various conditions (outside the scope of those contained in Article 4 of the Charter), which in some cases required recognition of the applicant (as an international subject) prior to its admission to membership.4

In an effort to resolve the dilemmas regarding the legal aspects of the conditions required for admission to membership and to eliminate the various stalemates that were occurring in the admission process, the UN General Assembly, by Resolution 113 (II) of

November 17, 1947, requested that the International Court of Justice give an advisory opinion on the following question:
Is a Member of the United Nations which is called upon, in virtue of Article 4 of the Charter, to pronounce itself by its vote, either in the Security Council or in the General Assembly, on the admission of a State to membership in the United Nations, juridically entitled to make its consent to the admission dependent on conditions not expressly provided by paragraph 1 of the said Article? 5
The following conditions are expressly set forth in Article 4, paragraph 1 of the UN Charter, which provides: “Membership in the United Nations is open to all other [i.e., other than the original UN members] peaceloving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.” The next paragraph of the article states the procedural rule that “[t]he admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.”

In its Advisory Opinion, Admission of a State to the United Nations, the Court first concluded that the question put to it in an abstract form had a legal nature. Consequently, the Court was required to provide an interpretation of Article 4, paragraph 1 of the Charter and, by virtue of Article 96 of the Charter and Article 65 of its Statute and as “the principal judicial organ of the United Nations,” it had the competence to give such an interpretation. The Court then observed that paragraph 1 of Article 4 in effect contains five conditions; to be admitted to membership in the United Nations, an applicant must (1) be a state; (2) be peace-loving; (3) accept the obligations of the UN Charter; (4) be able to carry out these obligations; and (5) be willing to do so. Further, the Court found that the question put to it by the General Assembly could be reduced to the following:
are the conditions stated in paragraph 1 of Article 4 exhaustive in character in the sense that an affirmative reply would lead to the conclusion that a Member is not legally entitled to make admission dependent on conditions not expressly provided for in that Article, while a negative reply would, on the contrary, authorize a Member to make admission dependent also on other conditions.6

After thorough consideration, the International Court of Justice formulated its advisory opinion stating that a member of the United Nations that is called upon, by virtue of Article 4 of the Charter, to pronounce itself by its vote, either in the Security Council or in the General Assembly, on the admission of a state to membership in the Organization, is not juridically entitled to make its consent dependent on conditions not expressly provided in paragraph 1 of that article.7
Among the most important arguments used by the Court in arriving at the above opinion were that (1) the UN Charter is a multilateral treaty whose provisions impose obligations on its members; (2) the text of paragraph 1 of Article 4, “by the enumeration which it contains and the choice of its terms, clearly demonstrates the intention of its authors to establish a legal rule which, while it fixes the conditions of admission, determines also the reasons for which admission may be refused”;8 and (3) the enumeration of the conditions in paragraph 1 of Article 4 is exhaustive (and “not merely stated by way of guidance or example”9), which follows from the fact that if the opposite were the case, “[i]t would lead to conferring upon Members an indefinite and practically unlimited power of discretion in the imposition of new conditions.”10

In its deliberations, the Court specifically analyzed whether the political character of the organs responsible for admission (the Security Council and the General Assembly, by virtue of paragraph 2 of Article 4), or for the maintenance of world peace (the Security Council, pursuant to Article 24 of the Charter), engendered arguments leading to the contrary conclusion regarding the exhaustive character of the conditions enumerated in paragraph 1 of Article 4. The Court rejected this interpretation and held that “[t]he political character of an organ cannot release it from the observance of the treaty provisions established by the Charter when they constitute limitations on its powers or criteria for its judgment.”11 Thus, the Charter limits the freedom of political organs and no “political considerations” can be superimposed on, or added to, the conditions set forth in Article 4 that could prevent admission to membership. This does not mean, however, that the conditions of Article 4 preclude taking into account relevant political factors that fall within their scope. Appreciation of such factors derives from the very broad and elastic nature of

the prescribed conditions and, according to the Court, it does not contradict the exhaustive character of these conditions.
The advisory opinion of the Court makes it apparent that, besides their exhaustive and explicit character, the conditions laid down in Article 4 of the Charter have two additional characteristics: (1) they must be fulfilled before admission is effected; and (2) once they are recognized as having been fulfilled, the applicant state acquires an unconditional right to UN membership. This last feature also follows from the “openness” to membership enshrined in Article 4, which comports with the universal character of the Organization.12

The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice was presented to the General Assembly at its third session, in December 1948. At that session the General Assembly adopted Resolution 197 (III), by which it “[r]ecommend[ed] that each member of the Security Council and of the General Assembly, in exercising its vote on the admission of new Members, should act in accordance with the foregoing opinion of the International Court of Justice.”13

This resolution and the Court’s advisory opinion have direct legal relevance to the issue of the admission of Macedonia to membership in the United Nations, since these documents interpret the Charter in a manner that limits the power of the UN organs to impose conditions on admission. The preamble to Security Council Resolution 817, by which Macedonia was recommended for admission, recognized that “the applicant fulfils the criteria for membership laid down in Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations.”14 According to Admission of a State to the United Nations and General Assembly Resolution 197, this statement means that the applicant has fulfilled all the required conditions for admission to membership in the United Nations and that no other conditions may be imposed. Contrary to the usual wording of Security Council resolutions recommending admission of a state, Resolution 817, after recognizing the fulfillment of the conditions in Article 4, contains an additional consideration, “that a difference has arisen over the name of the State, which needs to be resolved in the interest of the maintenance of peaceful and good-neighbourly relations in the region.”15 This condition, which is found in the

introductory part of the resolution, is reflected in its paragraph 2, which recommends the admission of the applicant state to membership in the United Nations. It describes “this State” as “being provisionally referred to for all purposes within the United Nations as ‘the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ pending settlement of the difference that has arisen over the name of the State.” The Macedonian Government strongly objected to the use of this provisional name,16 stating that “under no circumstances” was it prepared to accept that designation as the name for the country. Nevertheless, the text of the resolution remained unchanged. As a consequence, the imposed obligation to accept this provisional denomination and the closely related obligation to negotiate over the name of the country served as additional conditions that it was required to satisfy so as to gain admission to the United Nations.
These unusual conditions in Resolution 817 are extraneous to the limited list laid down in Article 4. Furthermore, these conditions transcend the act of admission in time. Since the Charter makes no provision for other conditions for admission, it appears that the conditions imposed on Macedonia have no legal basis. Certainly, the ICJ’s advisory opinion makes clear that all the conditions for admission to membership must be fulfilled before admission is effected. Since the conditions that were imposed represent purely political considerations, they are incompatible with the letter and spirit of the UN Charter.
Also relevant is the fact that Security Council Resolution 817, after explicitly recognizing that the applicant state had “fulfil[led] the criteria for membership laid down in Article 4,” recommended to the General Assembly that the state be admitted. The act of recommendation necessarily recognized that the conditions of Article 4 had been fulfilled. The additional conditions that were attached to the recommendation of Macedonia for membership in the United Nations therefore created a logical inconsistency because the Charter contains a closed list of requirements. Once those requirements are found to have been satisfied, the state has a right to admission. Additional conditions attached by the Security Council and General Assembly appear to negate the conclusion that the state is entitled to admission in accordance with the Charter conditions that were met.



Thus, the recognition of its fulfillment of the conditions for admission means that the Security Council affirmed that the applicant country is a peace-loving state, able and willing to carry out the obligations in the Charter, which include (among others) the obligation set forth in Article 2, paragraph 4: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” On this basis, it appears contradictory and incompatible with the law for the Security Council resolution to report that “a difference has arisen over the name of the State, which needs to be resolved in the interest of the maintenance of peaceful and good-neighbourly relations in the region.” This provision implies that the applicant state is unwilling to carry out the obligation contained in Article 2, paragraph 4. The ICJ’s above-mentioned advisory opinion and General Assembly Resolution 197 do not permit such contradictory statements--either the test for admission is met or it is not. The principles of exhaustiveness, explicitness, prior fulfillment and recognition, which are embedded in the Court=s interpretation of the conditions of Article 4 of the Charter, must mean that it would be logically inconsistent for additional conditions to be attached to the resolutions that recommend or the decisions that provide for the admission of a state.
It can be argued that the logic of the Court’s opinion also relates to the provision in Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter, which states: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter.”

Thus, in interpreting this paragraph in connection with the admission of states to membership in the United Nations, Judge Krylov (who took part in the 1948 ICJ proceedings) stated that a “Member of the United Nations is not justified in basing [its] opposition to the admission of a particular State on arguments which relate to matters falling essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the applicant State.”17 This statement reiterates the principle, embedded in the advisory opinion of the Court and in General Assembly Resolution 197, that, once the appropriate UN organs determine that the criteria

of Article 4 have been fulfilled, neither a UN organ nor a member of the Organization can condition the admission of the applicant state on any additional consideration, particularly if it essentially falls within that state’s domestic jurisdiction. Certainly, the name a state wishes to adopt is a domestic matter, having no direct impact on any other state.

Furthermore, on the basis of the principle of separability of domestic and international jurisdiction, it can be argued that the substantive Greek allegation that the name of the applicant implies “territorial claims” has no legal significance. Obviously, the name of a state, which is a subject of that state’s domestic jurisdiction (since every state naturally has an inherent right to a name), does not create international legal rights for the state that adopts the name, nor does it impose legal obligations on other states. Clearly, the name, per se, does not have a direct impact on the territorial rights of states. Greece advanced practically the same objections and demands as regards the recognition of Macedonia by the members of the European Community. Nevertheless, the EC Arbitration Commission on former Yugoslavia did not link the name of the country (Republic of Macedonia) to Greek territorial rights.18 Prominent scholars of international law have expressed similar views. For instance, in their course book on international law, Professors Henkin, Pugh, Schachter and Smit observe that there “appears to be no basis in international law or practice” for the Greek demand that Macedonia change its name, “claiming that the right to use that name should belong exclusively to Greece.”19 It is apparent that the Greek demands regarding the name of Macedonia are motivated mainly by concern that the admission to the United Nations of a state with that name may add strength in the political arena to possible Macedonian claims to Greek territory. The name itself has no legal bearing on such a potential dispute and no relevance to the qualifications that may legally be considered in connection with the admission of a state to the United Nations.
To nullify the Greek concerns that the name of the country implies territorial claims against Greece, Macedonia adopted two amendments to its Constitution on January 6, 1992. They assert that Macedonia “has no territorial claims against any neighboring states”; that its borders can be changed only in accordance with the Constitution and “generally accepted international norms”; and that, in exercising care for the status and rights of its citizens and

minorities in neighboring countries, it “shall not interfere in the sovereign rights of other States and their internal affairs.”20 It can further be noted that after the two countries concluded the Interim Accord of September 13, 1995, under the auspices of the United Nations, their relations entered into a period of steady and progressive development.

From the point of view of legal theory, the inherent right of a state to have a name can be derived from the necessity for a juridical personality to have a legal identity. In the absence of such an identity, the juridical person (such as a state) could--to a considerable degree (or even completely)--lose its capacity to conclude agreements and independently enter into and conduct its relations with other juridical persons. Therefore, the name of a state appears to be an essential element of its juridical personality and its statehood. The principles of the sovereign equality of states21 and the inviolability of their juridical personality 22 lead to the conclusion that the choice of a name is an inalienable right of the state. In this context, external interference with this basic right appears to be inadmissible, irrespective of territorial and similar arguments. This conclusion is consistent with the previously cited opinion of Henkin, Pugh, Schachter and Smit that states have no exclusive rights to names under international law. Perhaps the international community should develop appropriate legal mechanisms and rules for hypothetical situations when two or more states wish to adopt the same name. This is not the case in the Greek-Macedonian dispute, however, since the name “Macedonia” is used by Greece to designate one of its provinces (which is not an international legal person).
The question of a juridical linkage between the conditions for admission to UN membership and the conditions for recognition of a state was deliberated in the United Nations at the beginning of the 1950s. A memorandum on legal aspects of representation in the United Nations23 was prepared by the Secretariat and communicated to the Security Council. The memorandum emphasized that the recognition of a state and its admission to UN membership are governed by different rules. Recognition is essentially a “political” decision of individual states, whereas admission to membership is a collective act of the General Assembly based on the right to membership of any state that meets the prescribed criteria. Therefore, there is no link--juridical or otherwise --between the conditions for

recognition of a state by another state and the conditions for admission as a member to the United Nations. On this basis, the memorandum stressed that it is inadmissible to condition admission on recognition, since admission does not imply recognition by any government.24 This conclusion is consistent with the previously discussed advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice and with the principle of universality of the United Nations.

In conclusion, once the conditions set forth in Article 4 of the UN Charter have been fulfilled, the applicant state acquires an inalienable right to UN membership. On the basis of the Security Council’s assessment that Macedonia had satisfied the conditions of Article 4 and General Assembly Resolution 197 regarding observance of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, it appears that the Macedonian application for membership should have been handled in accordance with the existing standard admission procedure and law. The additional conditions related to the name of the state constitute violations of the Charter.



Notes
1|SC Res. 817, UN SCOR, 48th Sess., Res. & Dec., at 132, para. 2, UN Doc. S/INF/49 (1993); GA Res. 47/225, UN GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, Vol. 2, at 6, UN Doc. A/47/49 (1993).
2|SC Res. 817, supra note 1, para. 1.
3|See, e.g., UN SCOR, 1st Sess., 2d series, Supp. 4, at 40, 47, 53 (1946); id., 2d Sess., Spec. Supp. 3, 29, 35-36, 42, 51-53 (1947).
4|See UN SCOR, 2d Sess., 181st mtg. at 1920, 1935 (1947); id., 3d Sess., 330th mtg. at 16 (1948).
5|GA Res. 113 (II), UN GAOR, 2d Sess. Res., at 19 (1947).
6|See Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4), Advisory Opinion, 1948 ICJ REP. 57, 61 (May 28).
7|Id. at 65.
8|Id. at 62.
9|Id.
10|1948 ICJ REP. at 63 (in which case paragraph 1 of Article 4 would cease to be a legal norm). It follows that the conditions laid down in paragraph 1 of Article 4 are not only necessary, but also sufficient conditions for admission to membership in the United Nations.
11|Id. at 64.
12|This view of the Court was elaborated specifically and in depth by Judge Alvarez in his concurring individual opinion. He stated that,

having regard to the nature of the universal international society, the purposes of the United Nations Organization and its mission of universality, it must be held that all States fulfilling the conditions required by Article 4 of the Charter have a right to membership in that Organization. The exercise of this right cannot be blocked by the imposition of other conditions not expressly provided for by the Charter, by international law or by a convention, or on grounds of a political nature.

Id. at 71.
13|GA Res. 197 (III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., Res., pt. 1, at 30 (1948).
14|SC Res. 817, supra note 1, preamble.
15|Id.
16|See UN SCOR, 48th Sess., Supp. for Apr.-June, at 35, UN Doc. S/25541 (1993).
17|Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4), Advisory Opinion, 1948 ICJ REP. 57, 113 (May 28) (Krylov, J., dissenting).
18|See EC Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 6, 31 ILM 1507, 1511 (1992).
19|LOUIS HENKIN, RICHARD C. PUGH, OSCAR SCHACHTER & HANS SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 253 (3d ed. 1993).
20|For an English translation of the Macedonian Constitution, including amendments, see 11 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD & Supp. 98-6, at 1 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1994, 1998).
21|UN CHARTER Art. 2, para. 1.
22|Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res. 2625 (XXV), UN GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, 123, 124, UN Doc. A/8028 (1970).

23|Memorandum on legal aspects of the problem of representation in the United Nations, UN Doc. S/1466, at 2 (1950).
24|Id. at 3.

Анонимен рече...

Од страна на Македонската Влада треба да се покрене широка дипломатска акција со која ќе објасни дека изборот на името е суверено и инхерентно право на секоја држава и дека негирањето на ова право, што е сторено во спомнатите резолуции на ОН и Советот за безбедност, значи негирање на правото, преку нелимитиран нелегален процес, воопшто да се има име. Ова произлегува од фактот дека името, како правен идентитет на меѓународно-правен субјект како што е државата, е есенцијален дел од нејзиниот субјективитет и оттаму неможе да биде предмет на одзимање, наметнување и/или преговарање. Од друга страна, името како такво не имплицира правни последици (нпр. право на нечии територии) и понатаму треба да се има предвид и дека со Амандманите воведени во својот Устав, Македонија експлицитно се оградува од такви интерпретации. Ова се базични аргументи кои му ја одземаат правната сила на грчкиот аргумент дека името Македонија имплицира “територијални претензии”. Името на една држава по себе не имплицира или влијае на територијалните права и обврски на таа држава, како и на другите држави. Овој аргумент се однесува и кон другите права и обврски на државите (културни, историски и слично).

Во врска со ова, македонската стратегија за воспоставување на уставното име во ОН не треба да се ослонува на популарната “двојна формула”, предложена од страна на Кризната група. Оваа политичка формула нема никаква основа во меѓународното право. Ако една држава има суверено и природно основно право да има име (jus cogens), а со тоа и право суверено да си го бира (т.е. да го одредува својот правен идентитет, како битен елемент на својот меѓународен субјективитет и државност), тогаш предметот за преговарање за меѓународно и внатрешно (само за Грција) име, е очигледно целосно бесмислен. Покрај правно, оваа формула е и политички бесмислена бидејќи ја игнорира основната идеја на грчкото противење за меѓународна употреба на уставното име на Македонија: не Грција да ја нарекува Македонија како што сака, туку да спречи меѓународната заедница да ја признае Македонија под нејзиното уставно име. Според тоа, сосема е јасно дека Грција никогаш не би ја прифатила “двојната формула” како основа за преговорите околу името. Инсистирањето на македонската страна на “двојната формула” како основа за преговорите од страна (како и од Грција) се гледа како наивен метод за опструкција на преговорите. Генерално, доколку Македонија е решена да си го сочува своето уставно име, било која “политичка формула” не може да претставува основа за преговорите со Грција во ООН: опструкцијата, во повеќе или помалку очигледен вид, мора да остане (впрочем како и досега) основното средство на македонската стратегија. Тоа пак е спротивно со резолуциите на ОН од 1993 година, сврзани со приемот на Македонија во ОН, каде што од преговарачите се бара да дојдат до “брзо решение на спорот”. Отсуството на санкции према преговарачите за неисполнување на овој дел од резолуциите може да се интерпретира како “молчеливо признание” на светската заедница дека изборот на името е суверено право на секоја држава, што делува како охрабрување на македонската страна за нејзината позиција и тактика во преговорите (т.е. практично, за нивна опструкција). Но овој пристап кон проблемот на името на Македонија во ОН, кој се базира на принципот “laisser-passer” и на надежта дека со време се’ повеќе држави ќе ја признаваат Македонија под нејзиното уставно име, ја држи Македонија во нерамноправен статус во ОН, перманентно го навредува нејзиниот дигнитет, а признавањето на уставното име во билатерални релации го прави инструмент на политички калкулации (како што посведочи и неодамнешното признавање на уставното име од страна на САД). Ова последното е најопасниот елемент во политичкиот пристап за разрешување на проблемот на нашето уставно име: во одреден момент други политички приоритети можат да бидат сфатени (или третирани од политичката елита) како поважни од името (нпр. влегување во ЕУ) и да доведат до откажување од уставното име. Затоа, правниот пристап за решавање на проблемот на името се чини најадекватен. Постојното меѓународно право и’ дава на Македонија најчисти и најсилни аргументи и средства за враќање на нејзиното уставно име во ОН.

Правните аргументи претставуваат, исто така, најдобра основа во преговорите со Грција во ООН во рамките на било која “политичка формула”. Во еден момент ќе мора да се сфати (објасни) дека деловите од резолуциите на Советот за безбедност и Генералното Собрание на ОН за прием на Македонија во членство на ОН, кои ја наметнуваат референцата БЈРМ и обврските на Македонија да преговара со Грција за своето име претставуваат ултра вирес акти. За овие услови, дури ако државата и ги прифаќа, неможе да се гласа. Од друга страна, за овие услови се гласало при приемот на РМ во ОН во 1993 година во два органа (Советот за безбедност и Генералното Собрание) на ОН со што се дошло до пречекорување на овластувањата на овие два органа на Организацијата. Овие пречекорувања на овластувањата претставуваат грубо кршење на Повелбата на ОН и затоа поставените услови при приемот на Македонија во ОН се нелегални. Ова треба да биде еден од базичните правни аргументи во разговорите околу името со Грција во ООН.

За да се крене во акција за воспоставување на уставното име, потребно е да се мобилизира и професионално значително засили целиот релевантен кадровски потенцијал кај соодветните државни органи (Претседателот и МНР). Нашите дипломатски претставништва, посебно во државите на ЕУ и во оние држави каде се седиштата на клучни меѓународни организации, треба комплетно да се оспособат за аргументирање на ставовите кои се однесуваат на приемот и статусот на Македонија во ООН. Еден од основните елементи на таа аргументација би било јасното укажување дека дополнителните услови за приемот на Македонија во ОН се во спротивност со членовите 2 и 4 од Повелбата на ОН. Членот 2 се однесува на суверената еднаквост на државите членки, а членот 4 на постапката за прием во согласност со експлицитно пропишаните услови за прием.

Анонимен рече...

Др Игор Јанев
Виш научен соработник
Институт за политички студии - Београд

Времена спогодба не ја блокира Македонија да бара Судското мислење за членскиот статус под БЈРМ од Меѓународниот суд за правда во Хаг

Во врска со актуализирањето на прашањето дали заради Времената спогодба може да се покрене процедура за воспоставување на уставното име (Република Македонија) во ОН во овој текст ке дадеме одговор на ова прашање. Во мегународното договорно право е познато дека договори склучени кршејки ги основните jus cogens правила немаат правно дејство во дел од договорот во кој се крши jus cogens норма. Во мегународното договорно право постои опција договорот да важи, а парцијално да не важи обврска или обврските спротивни на jus cogens.
Името, како правен идентитет на меѓународно-правен субјект како што е државата, е есенцијален дел од нејзиниот субјективитет и оттаму неможе да биде предмет на одзимање, наметнување и/или преговарање (jus cogens). Од друга страна, името како такво не имплицира правни последици (нпр. право на нечии територии). Понатаму треба да се има предвид и дека со Амандманите воведени во својот Устав, Македонија експлицитно се оградува од такви интерпретации. Ова се базични аргументи кои му ја одземаат правната сила на грчкиот аргумент дека името Македонија имплицира “територијални претензии”. Името на една држава по себе не имплицира или влијае на територијалните права и обврски на таа држава, како и на другите држави. Овој аргумент се однесува и кон другите права и обврски на државите (културни, историски и слично).
Бидејки се работи за jus cogens норми Времена спогодба не ја блокира Македонија да бара Судското мислење за членскиот статус на Македонија под Бивша Југословенска Република Македонија (натаму БЈРМ) од Меѓународниот суд за правда во Хаг. Во било кое време Македонија може да побара добивање на вакво судско мислење, преку Генерално собрание на ОН, без кршење на Времената спогодба. Очигледно да дел од Времената спогодба кој се однесува за преговорите на правниот идентитет на државата не може да биде сфатн како правна обврска кој лимитира иницијатива на РМ во ОН, како и пречка за поставување на прашање од страна на Генералното собрание до Судот.

Во врска со ова, македонската стратегија за воспоставување на уставното име во ОН не треба да се ослонува на популарната “двојна формула”, предложена од страна на Кризната група. Оваа политичка формула нема никаква основа во меѓународното право. Ако една држава има суверено и природно основно право да има име (jus cogens), а со тоа и право суверено да си го бира (пак jus cogens, т.е. да го одредува својот правен идентитет, како битен елемент на својот меѓународен субјективитет), тогаш предметот за преговарање за меѓународно и внатрешно (само за Грција) име, е очигледно целосно бесмислен. Покрај правно, оваа формула е и политички бесмислена бидејќи ја игнорира основната идеја на грчкото противење за меѓународна употреба на уставното име на Македонија: не Грција да ја нарекува Македонија како што сака, туку да спречи меѓународната заедница да ја признае Македонија под нејзиното уставно име.

Во еден момент ќе мора да се сфати (објасни) дека деловите од резолуциите на Советот за безбедност и Генералното Собрание на ОН за прием на Македонија во членство на ОН, кои ја наметнуваат референцата (БЈРМ) и обврските на Македонија да преговара со Грција за своето име претставуваат ultra vires акти. За овие услови, дури ако државата и ги прифаќа, неможе да се гласа. Од друга страна, за овие услови се гласало при приемот на РМ во ОН во 1993 година во два органа (Советот за безбедност и Генералното Собрание) на ОН со што се дошло до пречекорување на овластувањата на овие два органа на Организацијата. Овие пречекорувања на овластувањата претставуваат грубо кршење на Повелбата на ОН и затоа поставените услови при приемот на Македонија во ОН се нелегални. Ова треба да биде еден од базичните правни аргументи во ООН.
За да се крене во акција за воспоставување на уставното име, потребно е да се мобилизира и професионално засили целиот релевантен кадровски потенцијал кај соодветните државни органи (Претседателот и МНР). Нашите дипломатски претставништва, посебно во државите на ЕУ и во оние држави каде се седиштата на клучни меѓународни организации, треба да се оспособат за аргументирање на ставовите кои се однесуваат на приемот и статусот на Македонија во ООН. Еден од основните елементи на таа аргументација би било јасното укажување дека дополнителните услови за приемот на Македонија во ОН се во спротивност со членовите 2 и 4 од Повелбата на ОН. Членот 2 се однесува на суверената еднаквост на државите членки, а членот 4 на постапката за прием во согласност со експлицитно пропишаните услови за прием.
Одолговлекувањето на решавање на проблемот со името, практикувано од сите досегашни македонски влади, не е во интерес на Македонија. Како што е познато, референцата БЈРМ дефинира еден нерамноправен правен статус на Македонија во ООН, особено во областа на нејзиното претставување. Тој статус е во спротивност со самата Повелба на ОН и со други меѓународно-правни акти. Понатаму, одолговлекување на решавањето на ова прашање има реперкусии и на нашите односи со ЕУ и НАТО. Се’ додека не се реши овој проблем, се чини дека Грција нема да изврши ратификација на Спогодбата за асоцијација и стабилизација.
Обврската за преговори со Грција околу името е во спомнатите резолуции на ОН, но токму тој нивен дел е правно нелегален те. спротивен на правилата jus cogens (односно пречекорување на надлежностите на органите на ОН). Со други зборови, наместо со преговори со Грција, или други политички средства, прашањето на уставното име на Македонија во ОН треба да се решава со правни средства во рамките на самиот ОН, каде проблемот е и настанат. Кршењето на членот 4 на Повелбата на ОН при приемот на Македонија во членство на ОН, од страна на органите на ОН, беше научно докажано уште во труд во “Американското списание за меѓународно право” во 1999 година. Спротивно на советодавното мислење на Меѓународниот суд за правда од 1948 година и Резолуцијата на Генералното Собрание на ОН од истата година, према кои држави се примат во членство на ОН само под условите експлицитно пропишани во членот 4 на Повелбата, и дека тие услови неможат да се прошируваат со други дополнителни услови (од политички или било какви други причини), во резолуциите на Советот за безбедност и Генералното собрание од 1993 година, со кои Македонија се прима во членство на ОН, на неа и се наметнуваат два дополнителна услова: да ја прифати референцата Бивша Југословенска Република Македонија за употреба во рамките на ОН и да преговара со Грција околу своето име. До истиот заклучок, дека членот 4 на Повелбата е повреден во тие резолуции, доаѓа и Меѓународната кризна група во 2001 година, како и МАНУ во својата Промеморија од 2002 година. Дополнителните услови наметнати на Македонија при нејзиниот прием во ОН според тоа, се нелегални, а тоа се и обврските за Македонија кои од нив произлегуваат (т.е. да преговара со друга земја за своето име).
Клуч за решавање на проблемот на името на РМ во ОН е, според тоа, донесување на нова резолуција на Генералното собрание со која се отстрануваат дополнителните услови наметнати на Македонија во соодветните резолуции при нејзиниот прием во членство на ОН. Предлагање на таква резолуција на Генералното собрание може да иницира Македонија, сама или со група на други држави-членки, доколку процени дека исходот на гласањето ќе биде позитивен. Доколку пак, и покрај една подолга интензивна политичка активност и “лобирање”, потполна увереност во позитивен исход на една таква резолуција не се добие, тогаш Македонија треба да го постави прашањето за легалноста на дополнителните услови пред Меѓународниот суд за правда (преку соодветна резолуција на Генералното собрание). Судот веќе во 1948-та година ја дал својата интерпретација на членот 4 на Повелбата, исклучувајќи секое проширување на условите за прием. Затоа неговото мислење по истото прашање не може да биде различно од тоа во 1948 година. Во праксата на Генералното собрание, од друга страна, до сега не е забележан случај кога Генералното собрание на ОН не го уважило советодавното мислење на Меѓународниот суд за правда.
Решението на проблемот на името на РМ во ОН преку барање на советодавно мислење од Меѓународниот суд за правда е единствен пат за Македонија бидејќи ги инволвира само принципите и нормите на меѓународното право, авторитетот на Судот кој еднаш се произнел по оваа прашање и ги избегнува игрите на политичките интереси каде македонскиот влог е релативно мал. Само во тој пристап кон проблемот сувереното право за избор на името ја има својата полна “тежина”, а грчките барања за интервенција во туѓо име остануваат без основа. Само на таков пристап се обезбедува политички неутрално решение на проблемот и овозможува на меѓународните интеграции, чија членка е и Грција, да спроведуваат заедничка политика према Македонија (вклучувајќи го и признавањето на нејзиното уставно име), повикувајќи се на политичката воља на светската заедница (изразена во ОН).

Анонимен рече...

Др Игор Јанев
Виш научен соработник
Институт за политички студии - Београд

Времена спогодба не ја блокира Македонија да бара Судското мислење за членскиот статус под БЈРМ од Меѓународниот суд за правда во Хаг

Во врска со актуализирањето на прашањето дали заради Времената спогодба може да се покрене процедура за воспоставување на уставното име (Република Македонија) во ОН во овој текст ке дадеме одговор на ова прашање. Во мегународното договорно право е познато дека договори склучени кршејки ги основните jus cogens правила немаат правно дејство во дел од договорот во кој се крши jus cogens норма. Во мегународното договорно право постои опција договорот да важи, а парцијално да не важи обврска или обврските спротивни на jus cogens.
Името, како правен идентитет на меѓународно-правен субјект како што е државата, е есенцијален дел од нејзиниот субјективитет и оттаму неможе да биде предмет на одзимање, наметнување и/или преговарање (jus cogens). Од друга страна, името како такво не имплицира правни последици (нпр. право на нечии територии). Понатаму треба да се има предвид и дека со Амандманите воведени во својот Устав, Македонија експлицитно се оградува од такви интерпретации. Ова се базични аргументи кои му ја одземаат правната сила на грчкиот аргумент дека името Македонија имплицира “територијални претензии”. Името на една држава по себе не имплицира или влијае на територијалните права и обврски на таа држава, како и на другите држави. Овој аргумент се однесува и кон другите права и обврски на државите (културни, историски и слично).
Бидејки се работи за jus cogens норми Времена спогодба не ја блокира Македонија да бара Судското мислење за членскиот статус на Македонија под Бивша Југословенска Република Македонија (натаму БЈРМ) од Меѓународниот суд за правда во Хаг. Во било кое време Македонија може да побара добивање на вакво судско мислење, преку Генерално собрание на ОН, без кршење на Времената спогодба. Очигледно да дел од Времената спогодба кој се однесува за преговорите на правниот идентитет на државата не може да биде сфатн како правна обврска кој лимитира иницијатива на РМ во ОН, како и пречка за поставување на прашање од страна на Генералното собрание до Судот.

Во врска со ова, македонската стратегија за воспоставување на уставното име во ОН не треба да се ослонува на популарната “двојна формула”, предложена од страна на Кризната група. Оваа политичка формула нема никаква основа во меѓународното право. Ако една држава има суверено и природно основно право да има име (jus cogens), а со тоа и право суверено да си го бира (пак jus cogens, т.е. да го одредува својот правен идентитет, како битен елемент на својот меѓународен субјективитет), тогаш предметот за преговарање за меѓународно и внатрешно (само за Грција) име, е очигледно целосно бесмислен. Покрај правно, оваа формула е и политички бесмислена бидејќи ја игнорира основната идеја на грчкото противење за меѓународна употреба на уставното име на Македонија: не Грција да ја нарекува Македонија како што сака, туку да спречи меѓународната заедница да ја признае Македонија под нејзиното уставно име.

Во еден момент ќе мора да се сфати (објасни) дека деловите од резолуциите на Советот за безбедност и Генералното Собрание на ОН за прием на Македонија во членство на ОН, кои ја наметнуваат референцата (БЈРМ) и обврските на Македонија да преговара со Грција за своето име претставуваат ultra vires акти. За овие услови, дури ако државата и ги прифаќа, неможе да се гласа. Од друга страна, за овие услови се гласало при приемот на РМ во ОН во 1993 година во два органа (Советот за безбедност и Генералното Собрание) на ОН со што се дошло до пречекорување на овластувањата на овие два органа на Организацијата. Овие пречекорувања на овластувањата претставуваат грубо кршење на Повелбата на ОН и затоа поставените услови при приемот на Македонија во ОН се нелегални. Ова треба да биде еден од базичните правни аргументи во ООН.
За да се крене во акција за воспоставување на уставното име, потребно е да се мобилизира и професионално засили целиот релевантен кадровски потенцијал кај соодветните државни органи (Претседателот и МНР). Нашите дипломатски претставништва, посебно во државите на ЕУ и во оние држави каде се седиштата на клучни меѓународни организации, треба да се оспособат за аргументирање на ставовите кои се однесуваат на приемот и статусот на Македонија во ООН. Еден од основните елементи на таа аргументација би било јасното укажување дека дополнителните услови за приемот на Македонија во ОН се во спротивност со членовите 2 и 4 од Повелбата на ОН. Членот 2 се однесува на суверената еднаквост на државите членки, а членот 4 на постапката за прием во согласност со експлицитно пропишаните услови за прием.
Одолговлекувањето на решавање на проблемот со името, практикувано од сите досегашни македонски влади, не е во интерес на Македонија. Како што е познато, референцата БЈРМ дефинира еден нерамноправен правен статус на Македонија во ООН, особено во областа на нејзиното претставување. Тој статус е во спротивност со самата Повелба на ОН и со други меѓународно-правни акти. Понатаму, одолговлекување на решавањето на ова прашање има реперкусии и на нашите односи со ЕУ и НАТО. Се’ додека не се реши овој проблем, се чини дека Грција нема да изврши ратификација на Спогодбата за асоцијација и стабилизација.
Обврската за преговори со Грција околу името е во спомнатите резолуции на ОН, но токму тој нивен дел е правно нелегален те. спротивен на правилата jus cogens (односно пречекорување на надлежностите на органите на ОН). Со други зборови, наместо со преговори со Грција, или други политички средства, прашањето на уставното име на Македонија во ОН треба да се решава со правни средства во рамките на самиот ОН, каде проблемот е и настанат. Кршењето на членот 4 на Повелбата на ОН при приемот на Македонија во членство на ОН, од страна на органите на ОН, беше научно докажано уште во труд во “Американското списание за меѓународно право” во 1999 година. Спротивно на советодавното мислење на Меѓународниот суд за правда од 1948 година и Резолуцијата на Генералното Собрание на ОН од истата година, према кои држави се примат во членство на ОН само под условите експлицитно пропишани во членот 4 на Повелбата, и дека тие услови неможат да се прошируваат со други дополнителни услови (од политички или било какви други причини), во резолуциите на Советот за безбедност и Генералното собрание од 1993 година, со кои Македонија се прима во членство на ОН, на неа и се наметнуваат два дополнителна услова: да ја прифати референцата Бивша Југословенска Република Македонија за употреба во рамките на ОН и да преговара со Грција околу своето име. До истиот заклучок, дека членот 4 на Повелбата е повреден во тие резолуции, доаѓа и Меѓународната кризна група во 2001 година, како и МАНУ во својата Промеморија од 2002 година. Дополнителните услови наметнати на Македонија при нејзиниот прием во ОН според тоа, се нелегални, а тоа се и обврските за Македонија кои од нив произлегуваат (т.е. да преговара со друга земја за своето име).
Клуч за решавање на проблемот на името на РМ во ОН е, според тоа, донесување на нова резолуција на Генералното собрание со која се отстрануваат дополнителните услови наметнати на Македонија во соодветните резолуции при нејзиниот прием во членство на ОН. Предлагање на таква резолуција на Генералното собрание може да иницира Македонија, сама или со група на други држави-членки, доколку процени дека исходот на гласањето ќе биде позитивен. Доколку пак, и покрај една подолга интензивна политичка активност и “лобирање”, потполна увереност во позитивен исход на една таква резолуција не се добие, тогаш Македонија треба да го постави прашањето за легалноста на дополнителните услови пред Меѓународниот суд за правда (преку соодветна резолуција на Генералното собрание). Судот веќе во 1948-та година ја дал својата интерпретација на членот 4 на Повелбата, исклучувајќи секое проширување на условите за прием. Затоа неговото мислење по истото прашање не може да биде различно од тоа во 1948 година. Во праксата на Генералното собрание, од друга страна, до сега не е забележан случај кога Генералното собрание на ОН не го уважило советодавното мислење на Меѓународниот суд за правда.
Решението на проблемот на името на РМ во ОН преку барање на советодавно мислење од Меѓународниот суд за правда е единствен пат за Македонија бидејќи ги инволвира само принципите и нормите на меѓународното право, авторитетот на Судот кој еднаш се произнел по оваа прашање и ги избегнува игрите на политичките интереси каде македонскиот влог е релативно мал. Само во тој пристап кон проблемот сувереното право за избор на името ја има својата полна “тежина”, а грчките барања за интервенција во туѓо име остануваат без основа. Само на таков пристап се обезбедува политички неутрално решение на проблемот и овозможува на меѓународните интеграции, чија членка е и Грција, да спроведуваат заедничка политика према Македонија (вклучувајќи го и признавањето на нејзиното уставно име), повикувајќи се на политичката воља на светската заедница (изразена во ОН).

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Др Игор Јанев
Виш научен соработник
Институт за политички студии - Београд

Времена спогодба не ја блокира Македонија да бара Судското мислење за членскиот статус под БЈРМ од Меѓународниот суд за правда во Хаг

Во врска со актуализирањето на прашањето дали заради Времената спогодба може да се покрене процедура за воспоставување на уставното име (Република Македонија) во ОН во овој текст ке дадеме одговор на ова прашање. Во мегународното договорно право е познато дека договори склучени кршејки ги основните jus cogens правила немаат правно дејство во дел од договорот во кој се крши jus cogens норма. Во мегународното договорно право постои опција договорот да важи, а парцијално да не важи обврска или обврските спротивни на jus cogens.
Името, како правен идентитет на меѓународно-правен субјект како што е државата, е есенцијален дел од нејзиниот субјективитет и оттаму неможе да биде предмет на одзимање, наметнување и/или преговарање (jus cogens). Од друга страна, името како такво не имплицира правни последици (нпр. право на нечии територии). Понатаму треба да се има предвид и дека со Амандманите воведени во својот Устав, Македонија експлицитно се оградува од такви интерпретации. Ова се базични аргументи кои му ја одземаат правната сила на грчкиот аргумент дека името Македонија имплицира “територијални претензии”. Името на една држава по себе не имплицира или влијае на територијалните права и обврски на таа држава, како и на другите држави. Овој аргумент се однесува и кон другите права и обврски на државите (културни, историски и слично).
Бидејки се работи за jus cogens норми Времена спогодба не ја блокира Македонија да бара Судското мислење за членскиот статус на Македонија под Бивша Југословенска Република Македонија (натаму БЈРМ) од Меѓународниот суд за правда во Хаг. Во било кое време Македонија може да побара добивање на вакво судско мислење, преку Генерално собрание на ОН, без кршење на Времената спогодба. Очигледно да дел од Времената спогодба кој се однесува за преговорите на правниот идентитет на државата не може да биде сфатн како правна обврска кој лимитира иницијатива на РМ во ОН, како и пречка за поставување на прашање од страна на Генералното собрание до Судот.

Во врска со ова, македонската стратегија за воспоставување на уставното име во ОН не треба да се ослонува на популарната “двојна формула”, предложена од страна на Кризната група. Оваа политичка формула нема никаква основа во меѓународното право. Ако една држава има суверено и природно основно право да има име (jus cogens), а со тоа и право суверено да си го бира (пак jus cogens, т.е. да го одредува својот правен идентитет, како битен елемент на својот меѓународен субјективитет), тогаш предметот за преговарање за меѓународно и внатрешно (само за Грција) име, е очигледно целосно бесмислен. Покрај правно, оваа формула е и политички бесмислена бидејќи ја игнорира основната идеја на грчкото противење за меѓународна употреба на уставното име на Македонија: не Грција да ја нарекува Македонија како што сака, туку да спречи меѓународната заедница да ја признае Македонија под нејзиното уставно име.

Во еден момент ќе мора да се сфати (објасни) дека деловите од резолуциите на Советот за безбедност и Генералното Собрание на ОН за прием на Македонија во членство на ОН, кои ја наметнуваат референцата (БЈРМ) и обврските на Македонија да преговара со Грција за своето име претставуваат ultra vires акти. За овие услови, дури ако државата и ги прифаќа, неможе да се гласа. Од друга страна, за овие услови се гласало при приемот на РМ во ОН во 1993 година во два органа (Советот за безбедност и Генералното Собрание) на ОН со што се дошло до пречекорување на овластувањата на овие два органа на Организацијата. Овие пречекорувања на овластувањата претставуваат грубо кршење на Повелбата на ОН и затоа поставените услови при приемот на Македонија во ОН се нелегални. Ова треба да биде еден од базичните правни аргументи во ООН.
За да се крене во акција за воспоставување на уставното име, потребно е да се мобилизира и професионално засили целиот релевантен кадровски потенцијал кај соодветните државни органи (Претседателот и МНР). Нашите дипломатски претставништва, посебно во државите на ЕУ и во оние држави каде се седиштата на клучни меѓународни организации, треба да се оспособат за аргументирање на ставовите кои се однесуваат на приемот и статусот на Македонија во ООН. Еден од основните елементи на таа аргументација би било јасното укажување дека дополнителните услови за приемот на Македонија во ОН се во спротивност со членовите 2 и 4 од Повелбата на ОН. Членот 2 се однесува на суверената еднаквост на државите членки, а членот 4 на постапката за прием во согласност со експлицитно пропишаните услови за прием.
Одолговлекувањето на решавање на проблемот со името, практикувано од сите досегашни македонски влади, не е во интерес на Македонија. Како што е познато, референцата БЈРМ дефинира еден нерамноправен правен статус на Македонија во ООН, особено во областа на нејзиното претставување. Тој статус е во спротивност со самата Повелба на ОН и со други меѓународно-правни акти. Понатаму, одолговлекување на решавањето на ова прашање има реперкусии и на нашите односи со ЕУ и НАТО. Се’ додека не се реши овој проблем, се чини дека Грција нема да изврши ратификација на Спогодбата за асоцијација и стабилизација.
Обврската за преговори со Грција околу името е во спомнатите резолуции на ОН, но токму тој нивен дел е правно нелегален те. спротивен на правилата jus cogens (односно пречекорување на надлежностите на органите на ОН). Со други зборови, наместо со преговори со Грција, или други политички средства, прашањето на уставното име на Македонија во ОН треба да се решава со правни средства во рамките на самиот ОН, каде проблемот е и настанат. Кршењето на членот 4 на Повелбата на ОН при приемот на Македонија во членство на ОН, од страна на органите на ОН, беше научно докажано уште во труд во “Американското списание за меѓународно право” во 1999 година. Спротивно на советодавното мислење на Меѓународниот суд за правда од 1948 година и Резолуцијата на Генералното Собрание на ОН од истата година, према кои држави се примат во членство на ОН само под условите експлицитно пропишани во членот 4 на Повелбата, и дека тие услови неможат да се прошируваат со други дополнителни услови (од политички или било какви други причини), во резолуциите на Советот за безбедност и Генералното собрание од 1993 година, со кои Македонија се прима во членство на ОН, на неа и се наметнуваат два дополнителна услова: да ја прифати референцата Бивша Југословенска Република Македонија за употреба во рамките на ОН и да преговара со Грција околу своето име. До истиот заклучок, дека членот 4 на Повелбата е повреден во тие резолуции, доаѓа и Меѓународната кризна група во 2001 година, како и МАНУ во својата Промеморија од 2002 година. Дополнителните услови наметнати на Македонија при нејзиниот прием во ОН според тоа, се нелегални, а тоа се и обврските за Македонија кои од нив произлегуваат (т.е. да преговара со друга земја за своето име).
Клуч за решавање на проблемот на името на РМ во ОН е, според тоа, донесување на нова резолуција на Генералното собрание со која се отстрануваат дополнителните услови наметнати на Македонија во соодветните резолуции при нејзиниот прием во членство на ОН. Предлагање на таква резолуција на Генералното собрание може да иницира Македонија, сама или со група на други држави-членки, доколку процени дека исходот на гласањето ќе биде позитивен. Доколку пак, и покрај една подолга интензивна политичка активност и “лобирање”, потполна увереност во позитивен исход на една таква резолуција не се добие, тогаш Македонија треба да го постави прашањето за легалноста на дополнителните услови пред Меѓународниот суд за правда (преку соодветна резолуција на Генералното собрание). Судот веќе во 1948-та година ја дал својата интерпретација на членот 4 на Повелбата, исклучувајќи секое проширување на условите за прием. Затоа неговото мислење по истото прашање не може да биде различно од тоа во 1948 година. Во праксата на Генералното собрание, од друга страна, до сега не е забележан случај кога Генералното собрание на ОН не го уважило советодавното мислење на Меѓународниот суд за правда.
Решението на проблемот на името на РМ во ОН преку барање на советодавно мислење од Меѓународниот суд за правда е единствен пат за Македонија бидејќи ги инволвира само принципите и нормите на меѓународното право, авторитетот на Судот кој еднаш се произнел по оваа прашање и ги избегнува игрите на политичките интереси каде македонскиот влог е релативно мал. Само во тој пристап кон проблемот сувереното право за избор на името ја има својата полна “тежина”, а грчките барања за интервенција во туѓо име остануваат без основа. Само на таков пристап се обезбедува политички неутрално решение на проблемот и овозможува на меѓународните интеграции, чија членка е и Грција, да спроведуваат заедничка политика према Македонија (вклучувајќи го и признавањето на нејзиното уставно име), повикувајќи се на политичката воља на светската заедница (изразена во ОН).

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Апел Влади и Председнику Републике Србије

Анонимен рече...

Апел Влади и Председнику Републике Србије


Апелујемо* на Владу Србије, Премијера Србије и Председника Србије да у Генералној скупштини Уједињених нација предложе Резолуцију којом би се прогласило супротним међународном праву свако једнострано или мултилатерално признање Косова као независног или полу-независног међународно-правног субјекта. Сматрамо да би свако једнострано или мултилатерално признање Косова било супротно основним нормама и принципима међународног права, а посебно ако би ово признање наступило мимо процеса који су у току у Савету безбедности Уједињених нација. У циљу онемогућавања да до признања Косова дође од стране неких држава чланица Уједињених нација, предлажемо да текст следећег Нацрта Резолуције хитно буде упућен у процедуру у Уједињеним нацијама:

Н А Ц Р Т Р Е З О Л У Ц И Ј Е

Генерална скупштина

позивајући се на члан 2. Повеље Уједињених нација;

позивајући се на члан 24. Повеље Уједињених нација;

позивајући се на члан 25. Повеље Уједињених нација;

подсећајући на Декларацију о принципима међународног права која се односи на пријатељске односе и сарадњу између држава сагласно Повељи Уједињених нација, из 1970. године;

узимајући у обзир Резолуцију Савета безбедности 1244. из1999. године;

тражи од држава чланица Уједињених нација да унилатерално или мултилатерално не признају независност Косова, док се не донесе Резолуција Савета безбедности Уједињених нација у којој се утврђује коначни статус Косова.



* Тим истраживача Института за политичке студије у Београду, којим координира др Игор Јанев, виши научни сарадник Института (постављено на сајт 29.9.2007.)

Анонимен рече...

APEL VLADI I PREDSEDNIKU REPUBLIKE SRBIJE

Apelujemo* na Vladu Srbije, Premijera Srbije i Predsednika Srbije da u Generalnoj skupštini Ujedinjenih nacija predlože Rezoluciju kojom bi se proglasilo suprotnim međunarodnom pravu svako jednostrano ili multilateralno priznanje Kosova kao nezavisnog ili polu-nezavisnog međunarodno-pravnog subjekta. Smatramo da bi svako jednostrano ili multilateralno priznanje Kosova bilo suprotno osnovnim normama i principima međunarodnog prava, a posebno ako bi ovo priznanje nastupilo mimo procesa koji su u toku u Savetu bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija. U cilju onemogućavanja da do priznanja Kosova dođe od strane nekih Država-članica Ujedinjenih nacija, predlažemo da tekst sledećeg Nacrta Rezolucije hitno bude upućen u proceduru u Ujedinjenim nacijama:

N A C R T R E Z O L U C I J A

Generalna skupština

Pozivajući se na član 2. Povelje Ujedinjenih nacija,

Pozivajući se na član 24. Povelje Ujedinjenih nacija,

Pozivajući se na član 25. Povelje Ujedinjenih nacija,

Potsećajući na Deklaraciju o principima međunarodnog prava koja se odnosi na prijateljske odnose i saradnju između država saglasno Povelji Ujedinjenih nacija, iz 1970. godine,


Uzimajući u obzir Rezoluciju Saveta bezbednosti 1244. iz1999. godine,


Traži od Država-članica Ujedinjenih nacija da unilateralno ili multilateralno ne priznaju nezavisnost Kosova dok se ne donese Rezolucija Saveta bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija u kojoj se utvrđuje konačni status Kosova.








* Tim istraživača Instituta za političke studije u Beogradu kojim koordinira dr Igor Janev, viši naučni saradnik Instituta (postavljeno na sajt 29.9.2007.)

Анонимен рече...

Апел Влади и Председнику Републике Србије


Апелујемо* на Владу Србије, Премијера Србије и Председника Србије да у Генералној скупштини Уједињених нација предложе Резолуцију којом би се прогласило супротним међународном праву свако једнострано или мултилатерално признање Косова као независног или полу-независног међународно-правног субјекта. Сматрамо да би свако једнострано или мултилатерално признање Косова било супротно основним нормама и принципима међународног права, а посебно ако би ово признање наступило мимо процеса који су у току у Савету безбедности Уједињених нација. У циљу онемогућавања да до признања Косова дође од стране неких држава чланица Уједињених нација, предлажемо да текст следећег Нацрта Резолуције хитно буде упућен у процедуру у Уједињеним нацијама:

Н А Ц Р Т Р Е З О Л У Ц И Ј Е

Генерална скупштина

позивајући се на члан 2. Повеље Уједињених нација;

позивајући се на члан 24. Повеље Уједињених нација;

позивајући се на члан 25. Повеље Уједињених нација;

подсећајући на Декларацију о принципима међународног права која се односи на пријатељске односе и сарадњу између држава сагласно Повељи Уједињених нација, из 1970. године;

узимајући у обзир Резолуцију Савета безбедности 1244. из1999. године;

тражи од држава чланица Уједињених нација да унилатерално или мултилатерално не признају независност Косова, док се не донесе Резолуција Савета безбедности Уједињених нација у којој се утврђује коначни статус Косова.



* Тим истраживача Института за политичке студије у Београду, којим координира др Игор Јанев, виши научни сарадник Института (постављено на сајт 29.9.2007.)

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